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The Rise of Risk in International Law 
Stephen Townley 
Abstract 
Risk analysis—a coping mechanism for the uncertainties we see everywhere around us—
is on the rise, including at the international level. It now informs, for instance, the work of the 
Security Council and human rights law and practice. While the story of how risk analysis has 
inflected international environmental law is frequently told, there has been little attention paid to 
the way in which risk is increasingly relevant to other areas of international law, including through 
“due diligence” standards. This Article fills this gap, describing risk’s propagation across different 
international legal fields. It also offers a taxonomy of the ways in which risk is relevant. This 
Article distinguishes, for instance, between the way risk sometimes authorizes the state to take 
an action and situations where the existence of risk obligates the state to react. Finally, this 
Article seeks to explain potential reasons for risk’s rise and indicate some of the consequences 
thereof, both salutary (such as greater participation in international legal decision-making) and 
less so (such as greater horizontal fragmentation of international law).  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Risk has become a preoccupation of states,1 businesses,2 and individuals.3 
What once was the subject of a Tom Cruise science fiction film4 is now before the 
U.S. Supreme Court.5 There is even an emergent theory of “proactive law” that 
seeks broadly to “shift[ ] the focus of attention from dispute-resolution to . . . legal 
risk management.”6 In the U.N. Security Council, we may be seeing a third 
generation of sanctions—not sanctions that apply with a broad brush to entire 
states, nor even measures that apply to designated individuals, entities or items, 
but sanctions triggered when a state believes that an individual, entity or item 
poses a particular risk; a similar point can be made with respect to U.N. 
peacekeeping missions, which are increasingly authorized to protect civilians at 
risk. More broadly, at the U.N., the new Secretary-General, in his first briefing of 
the Security Council, stressed the critical role of prevention,7 which, in turn, 
requires a framework for assessing the risk of conflict or atrocities occurring.8 
                                                 
1  JACQUELINE PEEL, SCIENCE AND RISK REGULATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (2010) 
(“Risk . . . has become a central concern of advanced regulatory states over the last few decades.”); 
see generally Monika Ambrus et al., Risk and International Law, in RISK AND THE REGULATION OF 
UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 5 (Monika Ambrus et al. eds., 2017) (discussing the 
“dialectical relation between law and uncertainty”); ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW 
MODERNITY (1992). 
2  See, for example, Susannah Snider, Explore Five Hot Jobs for MBA Graduates, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 20, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/KUL2-J7SN (opining that “an increasingly complicated, always-changing 
regulatory environment continues to boost demand for compliance officers”). 
3  This includes everything from health risks, see, for example, Gretchen Reynolds, Should a Simple Fitness 
Check Be Part of Your Checkup?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/well/move/should-a-simple-fitness-check-be-part-of-
your-checkup.html, to the risk of being attacked by terrorists, see, for example, Paul Sullivan, Taking 
a Rational Look at the Risk of Threats, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/your-money/taking-a-rational-look-at-the-risk-of-
threats.html.  
4  MINORITY REPORT (Dreamworks Pictures 2002). 
5  Cf. Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programs-
secret-algorithms.html (discussing Supreme Court review of a case where at sentencing the judge 
considered a statistical report that purported to show that the defendant posed “a high risk of 
violence, high risk of recidivism, high pretrial risk”). 
6  Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Paul Shrivastava, Beyond Compliance: Sustainable Development, Business, and 
Proactive Law, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 417, 438 (2015); see also George J. Siedel & Helena Haapio, Using 
Proactive Law for Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 641, 656–67 (2010). 
7  U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Security Council Open Debate on 
‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention and Sustaining Peace’ (Jan. 
10, 2017), https://perma.cc/24ER-9GF9 (discussing early warning). 
8  Cf. generally UNITED NATIONS, FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS FOR ATROCITY CRIMES: A TOOL FOR 
PREVENTION (2014), https://perma.cc/9VM2-8UB4. 
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Risk, of course, can mean different things in different contexts. In this 
Article, I use “risk” in two specific ways: what might be termed “known” and 
“unknown” risk, or “risk” and “uncertainty.”9 “Known” risk is the probability of 
occurrence of an event coupled with the magnitude of the resulting harm.10 
“Known” risk thus entails a certain measurability. Examples might be the risk 
presented by Russian roulette, where there is a known one-in-six chance of 
death,11 or the risk of car crashes entailed by particular highway driving conditions, 
which insurance companies have been able to assess based on statistical analyses.12 
“Unknown” risk is more inchoate potential peril about which we lack information 
either on the likelihood of the harm materializing or knowledge of the effect it 
would have if it did. An example might be the potential effect of introduction of 
an invasive species into a new ecosystem.13 Of course, this division into categories 
is something of an oversimplification, since risk operates along a quantifiability 
continuum.14 I also count “threats” as a form of “known” risk. Threats—at least 
as that term is used in this Article—are risks that tend to be assessed on an 
individual, qualitative basis rather than as a statistical measure. An example might 
be the threat that a particular individual will commit a terrorist attack.15 
Risk is distinct from, and antecedent to, harm. That is, the existence of risk 
may permit or require a state to act before harm has occurred. For instance, those 
who support the legal availability of anticipatory self-defense argue that a state 
                                                 
9  Cf. Jose Luis Bermudez & Michael S. Pardo, Risk, Uncertainty, and ‘Super Risk’, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 471, 473 (2015) (“Decisions under risk involve circumstances in which the 
probabilities and costs associated with possible outcomes can be quantified; whereas decisions 
under uncertainty involve circumstances in which the probabilities and costs associated with 
possible outcomes are not amenable to quantification.”). 
10  See Arie Trouwborst, Prevention, Precaution, Logic and Law: The Relationship Between the Precautionary 
Principle and the Preventative Principle in International Law and Associated Questions, 2 ERASMUS L. REV. 
105, 117 (2009). Cf. Glossary, in UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETY 215–16 (Paul C. Stern & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996) (defining risk). 
11  See NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO LEGAL 
RULES 74–75 (2002). 
12  See René Ureña, Risk and Randomness in International Legal Argumentation, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 787, 
790–91 (2008). 
13  See Rosie Cooney & Andrew T.F. Lang, Taking Uncertainty Seriously: Adaptive Governance and 
International Trade, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 525 (2007). 
14  Both “known” and “unknown” risk are, however, different from risk in the sense of individualized 
reasonable suspicion, which I exclude. Reasonable suspicion—and similar such standards—does 
not turn on the likelihood of a hazard materializing, but rather on whether there is sufficient 
information to deem that a hazard has materialized (even if it later turns out that it has not).  
15  While Professor Nicholas Tsagourias has suggested conceptual differences between risk and threat, 
he acknowledges that the two are merging in some contexts. See Nicholas Tsagourias, Risk and the 
Use of Force, in RISK AND THE REGULATION OF UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 
1, at 13, 15. 
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may use force even before an armed attack has occurred where the attack is 
believed to be imminent.16 Likewise, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and 
the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS) have recently asserted that states have an obligation to conduct 
environmental impact assessments (EIAs)17 where there is sufficient risk of 
environmental harm, but before the relevant action has been taken. 
Risk in these senses is taking off at the international level, and not just at the 
U.N. In particular, the last few years have been characterized by ever greater 
expansion of the field of application of prevention rules—rules requiring efforts 
to prevent harm, often by seeking to mitigate “known risks of harm”18—and due 
diligence obligations, or “best efforts” obligations of conduct.19 Prevention and 
due diligence are related, as due diligence is generally the relevant standard of 
conduct for the implementation of prevention rules.20 That is, even if a state has 
an obligation to prevent harm when a certain quantum of risk of that harm 
materializing exists, the obligation is seldom absolute. Rather, it more frequently 
takes the form of an obligation to take measures to mitigate the risk of the harm 
materializing. That prevention rules and due diligence obligations have risen to 
                                                 
16  Compare Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form and Substance of the UN Charter Regime, 
24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151, 157 (2013) (explaining that those who reject “anticipatory self-defense” 
believe that the “legality of resort to force . . . should operate as an on-off switch, flipped by the 
manifestation of readily identifiable factual preconditions”), with id. at 158 (explaining that those 
who support anticipatory self-defense prefer something more akin to a balancing test, one that 
would include the probability of an anticipated attack materializing and the consequences thereof—
in other words, a risk assessment). See also Noam Lubell, The Problem of Imminence in an Uncertain 
World, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1, 18–21 
(Marc Weller ed., 2014). In a widely-cited paper regarding self-defense against non-state actors, 
former U.K. Legal Adviser Daniel Bethlehem included “the probability of an attack” among the 
relevant factors that might justify anticipatory action. Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope 
of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Act by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 6 (2012); see also Brian Egan, International Law, Legal Diplomacy and the Counter-ISIL 
Campaign, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. OFF. LEGAL ADVISER (Apr. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/E5D4-295Q. 
17  See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 113, ¶ 204 (Apr. 20) 
[hereinafter Pulp Mills]; Certain Activities Carried Out By Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica 
v. Nicar.) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), 
Judgments, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 665, ¶ 104 (Dec. 16) [hereinafter Costa Rica v. Nicar.]; Responsibilities 
and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area 
(Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), Case No. 17, Advisory 
Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 11 ITLOS Rep. 10, ¶ 145 (Seabed Disputes Chamber).  
18  Trouwborst, Prevention, Precaution, Logic and Law, supra note 10, at 117. 
19  Timo Koivurova, Due Diligence, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 1 
(2010), https://perma.cc/BP2E-A9TM. 
20  See id. at ¶ 2 (describing due diligence as focusing on “preventive measures expected of a State”).  
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prominence at the same time is thus no surprise.21 These concepts are now being 
applied broadly, including to business activities,22 cyberspace,23 and assistance to 
                                                 
21  The precautionary approach, see, for example, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I 
(Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration], is also ever more salient (or at least ever more 
discussed), although I count that as a form of prevention applicable under conditions of uncertainty. 
See ARIE TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2002) [hereinafter EVOLUTION AND STATUS]; JACQUELINE PEEL, THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE: ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING AND SCIENTIFIC 
UNCERTAINTY 64 (2005). As Professor Arie Trouwborst has succinctly put it, “[i]f the 
environmental effects of a particular activity are known, measures to avoid them may be termed 
preventative. If such effects are uncertain, the same measures may also be labelled precautionary.” 
Trouwborst, Prevention, Precaution, Logic and Law, supra note 10, at 116. The lack of clarity regarding 
the precise contours of the precautionary approach, and its principal role (at least in my view) as a 
decision-making tool rather than an obligation or authorization, makes it however only an ancillary 
focus of this Article. Where I do address it, I use the terms “precaution” or “precautionary 
approach” rather than the term “precautionary principle,” although I mean what is often described 
in the literature as the latter. Cf. Jacqueline Peel, Precaution—A Matter of Principle, Approach or Process?, 
5 MELB. J. INTL L. 483, 485 (2004). 
22  See, for example, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Respect, Protect and Remedy’ 
Framework at 18–22, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles] (asserting 
the need for human rights due diligence and measures to mitigate risk). I recognize that businesses 
are not subjects of international law. That said, given the prominence of the U.N. Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, I include discussion of how those Principles are being understood 
and implemented. Cf. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422 (2000) (discussing the salience of certain non-binding 
commitments). 
23  See, for example, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 
27 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013); Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, 125 
YALE L.J. FORUM 68, 70 (2015) (“[E]xperts unanimously agreed that states shoulder a due diligence 
obligation with respect to both government and private cyber infrastructure on, and cyber activities 
emanating from, their territory.”); David E. Graham, Cyber Threats and the Law of War, 4 J. NAT’L 
SEC. L. & POL’Y 87, 93–94 (2010); Karine Bannelier-Christakis, Cyber Diligence: A Low-Intensity Due 
Diligence Principle for Low-Intensity Cyber Operations?, 14 BALTIC Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2014) (“Does due 
diligence imply an obligation for States to monitor cyber activities on their territory? The answer to 
this question is positive because, as it will be seen later, due diligence implies not only an obligation 
to react but also to prevent. Vigilance and monitoring thus go hand in hand.”); Jeffrey T.G. Kelsey, 
Note, Hacking Into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age 
of Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1427, 1445 (2008) (arguing that “[t]he international community 
could adopt such a test to govern cyber warfare: the neutral state could satisfy its duty under IHL 
as long as it had applied the means at its disposal to detect and repel a belligerent’s incursions”); 
Beatrice A. Walton, Note, Duties Owed: Low-Intensity Cyber Attacks and Liability for Transboundary Torts 
in International Law, 126 YALE L. J. 1460, 1502 (2017) (“[W]here attribution to a state is impossible, 
but attribution to private entities operating within a state’s territory or via infrastructure located in 
a state is possible, an attack should only give rise to liability if the state failed to act diligently in 
preventing it. That is, the applicable standard of care imposed upon states in these cases should be 
due diligence.”); Katharina Ziolkowski, General Principles of International Law as Applicable in Cyberspace, 
in PEACETIME REGIME FOR STATE ACTIVITIES IN CYBERSPACE 135, 135, 169 (Katharina Ziolkowsi, 
ed., 2013) [hereinafter PEACETIME REGIME]; Daniel Ortner, Comment, Cybercrime and Punishment: 
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states and armed groups during armed conflict.24 Legal regimes predicated upon 
threats, too, are gaining increasing significance in international law, and not just 
the question of self-defense. Thus, for instance, the Security Council has begun to 
require states to take measures to halt the proliferation threat that certain items or 
transactions may pose.25 
While there is robust literature on the role of risk in various areas of domestic 
law,26 and while certain risk-related international law topics such as prevention27 
(and the precautionary approach) have been considered exhaustively, scholarship 
on those topics has generally remained within topical silos. Prevention, for 
instance, has principally been discussed in the context of international 
environmental law.28 
Other aspects of risk, such as due diligence, not only suffer from a deficit of 
cross-cutting analysis, but are also under-studied.29 Risk also remains under-
                                                 
The Russian Mafia and Russian Responsibility To Exercise Due Diligence To Prevent Trans-Boundary 
Cybercrime, 2015 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 177, 208 (2015) (“[T]he government should independently seek to 
measure and evaluate its progress by conducting impact assessments.”); see also Benedikt Pirker, 
Territorial Sovereignty and Integrity and the Challenges of Cyberspace, in PEACETIME REGIME, supra, at 189, 
208 (asserting that there “may be a certain minimum standard of control over cyber activities that 
needs to be respected”). Cf. Joshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention and Neutrality in Cyberspace: An 
Emerging Principle in the National Practice of International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 43, 47, 56 (2009) 
(discussing a neutral state’s obligation of due diligence and what a belligerent might do if the neutral 
state fails to take action). 
24  See, for example, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST 
GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE 
WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 150 (2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter ICRC 
REVISED COMMENTARY] (advancing a new interpretation of Common Article 1 that states have “a 
general duty of due diligence to prevent and repress breaches of the Conventions by private persons 
over which a State exercises authority . . . This is an obligation of means, whose content depends 
on the specific circumstances, in particular the foreseeability of the violations and the State’s 
knowledge thereof, the gravity of the breach, the means reasonably available to the State and the 
degree of influence it exercises over the private persons.”). 
25  See, for example, S.C. Res. 2094, ¶¶ 11, 15 (Mar. 7, 2013) (requiring states to “prevent the provision 
of financial services . . . that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile 
programmes” and not to provide financial support for trade with the DPRK “where such financial 
support could contribute” to the DPRK’s prohibited programmes or activities); S.C. Res. 2270, ¶¶ 
8, 17, 27, 35, 36 (Mar. 2, 2016); S.C. Res. 1929, ¶ 13 (June 9, 2010). 
26  Compare CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005), with 
Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1071 (2006) (book review). 
27  In this Article, I use the terms “prevention,” “preventive principle” and “preventative principle” 
interchangeably.  
28  For instance, an interesting recent volume on risk in international law addresses a number of topics 
separately. See Ambrus et al., supra note 1. 
29  See Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, 125 YALE L.J.F. 68 (2015). Perhaps 
the most robust study of due diligence was that conducted by the International Law Association, 
which formed a study group on the subject that produced two thorough reports: Study Group on Due 
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theorized in the sense that there has been little analysis of the variety of roles risk 
can play in legal regimes. By “role” I mean the effect the existence of the risk has 
on state conduct. For instance, risk could be either obligating or authorizing. The 
Security Council sanctions regimes I have briefly described above are examples of 
“risk as obligation”: that is, if there is sufficient risk, the state is obligated to freeze 
the assets or stop the transaction. On the other hand, with respect to anticipatory 
self-defense, risk (or threat) provides a legal authorization for a state to use force.30 
What a state is obligated or authorized to do may also vary. Thus, for instance, a 
prevention obligation might require a state to undertake an environmental impact 
assessment. This would be a procedural obligation (like an obligation to negotiate 
or cooperate in good faith), in the sense that it does not speak to the ultimate 
legality of the proposed activity. By contrast, anticipatory self-defense is a 
substantive authorization, in that it renders the actual use of force lawful, subject to 
necessity and proportionality.31 Finally, risk can be judged on a case-by-case basis, or 
specific activities can be categorized as more or less risky in advance—that is, risk 
can be relevant either as applied (or contextually), or facially.32 
Risk analysis can also be scoped more broadly or more narrowly—for 
instance, is it the risk to one’s own citizens that matters, the risk to neighboring 
states or their citizens, or the risk to all states or their citizens?33 Likewise, one 
                                                 
Diligence in International Law, 76 INT'L L. ASS'N REP. CONF. 947 (2014) [hereinafter ILA Study Group, 
First Report]; and Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law, 77 INT'L L. ASS'N REP. CONF. 1062 
(2016) [hereinafter ILA Study Group, Second Report]. Joanna Kulesza’s recent monograph on due 
diligence is a useful source regarding the ILC’s work, see JOANNA KULESZA, DUE DILIGENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2016), and Monica Hakimi’s work on state responsibility for the acts of third 
parties is an excellent and important contribution, see Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 
21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 341 (2010). 
30  See note 14, supra. This is not to say that there is a stark dichotomy here. Sometimes, a breach of 
an obligation to prevent a risk may give rise to an authorization on the part of another state to take 
action. I do not wish to engage debates regarding the relationship between obligations and rights.  
Rather, my claim is more descriptive—I classify risk as obligation or authorization based on where 
the legal focus has tended to lie.  
31  See generally Pulp Mills, supra note 17, for distinction between procedural and substantive obligations. 
Cf. Stefan Talmon, Jus Cogens after Germany v. Italy: Substantive and Procedural Rules Distinguished, 25 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 979, 984 (2012) (distinguishing procedural obligations from “procedural rules,” 
which do not address the lawfulness of the conduct at issue).  
32  Two examples are the placement of species on lists, such as Appendix II of the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species, Appendix II art. (2)(a), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 
[hereinafter CITES], and the identification of specific wastes by the Bamako Convention on the 
Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of 
Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, art. 2, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773.  
33  Cf. Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, AC v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1233 
(D. Nev. 2006) (“Nothing in NEPA’s language suggests Congress intended NEPA to apply outside 
United States territory.”), vacated 482 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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could take account of more or fewer sources of risk. For instance, under what 
circumstances should risk presented by purely private conduct be relevant? 
International law has increasingly begun to put these myriad forms of risk to 
use. As one commentator put it, prevention has “resurfac[ed] spectacularly.”34 
Likewise, while due diligence has a deep pedigree, it was not until the late 1980s 
and early 1990s that it began to be applied more broadly, in particular through 
human rights instruments and jurisprudence regarding violence against women.35 
On one level, a turn to risk analysis should not be surprising given the 
attractiveness of prevention over response in situations where the consequences 
of wrongful or injurious conduct are increasingly grave (or at least where our 
collective tolerance for such consequences continues to diminish). Moreover, it is 
a truism that the world is only growing more interdependent, and thus it makes 
sense that techniques developed in the context of transboundary environmental 
disputes are now being applied more broadly.36 On a deeper level, however, while 
under domestic law risk analysis can sometimes be seen as anti-democratic 
(insofar as it may rely on experts rather than popular will),37 at the international 
level, it may actually be a way to appeal to and involve an audience beyond other 
states. That is, if international law claims are increasingly directed not just to other 
states, but also to civil society and individual citizens, risk (and the empirical 
approach it can bring with it) may be an attractive tool. The turn to risk may also 
be of a piece with the growth of a “global administrative space.”38 
                                                 
34  Ilias Plakokefalos, Prevention Obligations in International Environmental Law, 2 (Amsterdam Ctr. for Int’l. 
L., Working Paper No. 2013-12, 2013), https://perma.cc/4N2D-FP99; see also Costa Rica v. Nicar., 
supra note 17, at 23, ¶¶ 4, 53–57 (separate opinion by Cançado Trindade, J.) (discussing 
developments that “bring to the fore the relevance of the preventive dimension in contemporary 
international law”). While precaution is also much discussed, its current status is somewhat 
uncertain. Cf. Alexander Gillespie, The Precautionary Principle in the Twenty-First Century: A Case Study 
of Noise Pollution in the Ocean, 22 INT’L J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 61, 70 (2007) (“[O]utside of the 
explicit adoption of the [precautionary] principle in some international texts, it has no general 
application.”); Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 
123, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (“The precautionary principle is regarded by 
some as having crystallized into a general principle of customary international environmental law. 
Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as a principle of general or customary international 
law appears less than clear.”) (emphasis added). 
35  See, for example, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, ¶ 24(a), U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1993) (“States 
parties should take appropriate and effective measures to overcome all forms of gender-based 
violence, whether by public or private act.”) (emphasis added); Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, art. 7(b), June 9, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1534 (“[A]pply due diligence . . . .”). 
36  See, for example, Tsagourias, supra note 15, at 13. 
37  See Ureña, supra note 12, at 817 (citing sources). 
38  Cf. Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law 
in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 1, 1 (2006) (describing the global administrative 
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This Article seeks to unpack the rise of risk at the international level and 
make three contributions. First, it uses illustrative episodes, particularly from the 
history of prevention (and, to a limited extent, precaution39) and due diligence, to 
sketch the story of this rise. It strives to go beyond the usual account, to look 
across disciplines, and to apply a more rigorous taxonomy to the roles risk has 
played. Second, it posits and seeks to illuminate a recent trend in favor of 
increasing use of risk in international law. 
Third, and finally, the Article offers tentative explanations for this trend and 
thoughts on the potential consequences thereof. For example, one such 
consequence is that international courts and tribunals may not be well suited to 
reviewing risk analysis (or the decisions that flow from such analysis). A second 
consequence might be the potential for horizontal fragmentation (that is, the 
potential for differences of understanding of international law among states as 
they reach different conclusions about the risks presented by particular activities 
and hence the potential that state practice and opinio juris will begin to diverge, 
creating different “international laws”). 
The Article proceeds in six parts. In Part II, I set the stage by describing the 
U.N. Security Council’s increasing use of risk-based approaches. In Part III, I go 
back in time to explain how we got to where we are today, focusing in particular 
on the development of the prevention and due diligence doctrines. In Section IV, 
I identify the broad range of areas and issues that are now addressed through the 
prism of risk, and use the taxonomy I have sketched above to describe them. In 
Part V, I offer potential reasons for why the use of risk may be increasing (and 
the consequences thereof), and in Part VI, I provide a brief conclusion. 
II.  THE U.N.  SECURITY COUNCIL AND RISK  
In this Part, I describe recent Security Council practice to give some sense 
of how prevalent risk-based approaches have become. The Security Council 
increasingly functions as a legislative or administrative body; at the same time, 
treaty-making has declined, making Council practice a useful lens for 
                                                 
space as one where “administrative functions are performed in often complex interplays between 
officials and institutions on different levels,” including the international level). On global 
governance generally, see the useful repository of papers at N.Y.U.’s Institute for International Law 
and Justice, www.iilj.org [https://perma.cc/Y2SW-82X4]. 
39  Precaution, or the “precautionary approach,” is a term that is notoriously difficult to define. Many, 
however, cite the Rio Declaration as setting it forth in classical form. That declaration, in its 
Principle 15, states that “[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” Rio Declaration, supra note 21. See generally 
supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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understanding risk analysis.40 I focus on two areas of Council practice in particular: 
sanctions and the related area of suppression of terrorist financing, and the 
protection of civilians. An analysis of these two areas shows how the Council is 
using risk in myriad ways: as obligation and as authorization, as process and as 
substance, and as a tool to be applied broadly or narrowly depending on the 
situation. 
A.  Sanctions 
In this Section, I turn first to the ways in which the Security Council has 
made sanctions regimes more risk-based. The Security Council has traditionally 
used two principal tools in the sanctions space: (1) arms embargoes or other 
restrictions on transactions with or destined to a particular state; and (2) asset 
freezes or travel bans on identified individuals or entities.41 There are hybrid 
forms, such as the arms embargoes on particular individuals in Yemen42 and on 
individuals and entities associated with Al Qaeda,43 but, at the risk of over-
generalization, the former principally speaks to what is being transferred whereas 
the latter concerns with whom one is dealing. Moreover, the “what” and the “who” 
have tended to be predicated upon past conduct or an assessment of the current 
state of affairs.44 The basis for imposing sanctions has not tended to be the likely 
future effect of a particular transaction or a person’s probable future conduct.45 
                                                 
40  See Stefan Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 175, 175 (2005) (“As 
has recently been noted, the Security Council has entered its legislative phase.”). 
41  These individuals or entities are commonly identified in an annex adopted as part of a Security 
Council resolution or in specific listing proposals that are then agreed upon by all Council members 
operating in the format of a Security Council sanctions committee. 
42  S.C. Res. 2216, ¶ 14 (Apr. 14, 2015).  
43  S.C. Res. 2253, ¶ 2(c) (Dec. 17, 2015). 
44  We have begun to see self-judging assessments of whether individuals or entities should be subject 
to asset freezes or travel bans (in the sense that the freeze or the ban would apply to individuals or 
entities a state believes has engaged in sanctionable conduct, rather than to individuals or entities 
that have been identified by the Council). For instance, Resolution 2270 applied the DPRK asset 
freeze to entities a particular state deems associated with the DPRK WMD or missile programs. 
S.C. Res. 2270, supra note 25, at ¶ 32. And in Resolution 2178, the Council applied a travel ban to 
those about whom a state has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe he 
or she is seeking to enter their territory for the purpose of committing terrorist acts. S.C. Res. 2178, 
¶ 8 (Sep. 23, 2014). Although these are important and novel developments in their own right, such 
approaches are not risk-based in the sense used by this Article insofar as they turn on a state’s 
understanding of the present state of affairs (that is, turning on questions such as whether a person 
is associated with a weapons program and what a person’s current intention may be), rather than a 
prediction regarding the future. 
45  At a more general level, of course, sanctions are meant to be preventative. 
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That recently changed.46 Thus, for instance, the first sanctions resolution on 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea), Resolution 
1718,47 took a relatively traditional approach, banning the export of certain 
identified items to the DPRK. But the next resolution, Resolution 1874, contained 
a provision calling upon states to prevent their nationals or entities organized 
under their laws from providing financial services that “could contribute” to the 
DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or missile programs.48 This was 
risk-based (most akin to a threat analysis), albeit hortatory. Only those services 
each state itself believed posed a sufficient risk of contributing to the DPRK’s 
prohibited activities triggered the provision. Resolution 2094 went even further 
by making this provision binding.49 
The next DPRK sanctions resolution, Resolution 2270, added a new 
formulation—obligations triggered by a “determination” regarding whether items 
or services could contribute to activities of concern.50 Thus, for instance, the 
resolution prohibits the sale or supply of “any item, except food or medicine, if 
the State determines that such item could directly contribute to the development 
of the DPRK’s operational capabilities of its armed forces.”51 
                                                 
46  There are some historical precedents for a risk-based approach, such as a travel ban on those 
“likely” to further or encourage Southern Rhodesian actions. See S.C. Res. 253, ¶ 5(b) (May 29, 
1968). But, they are few and far between. 
47  I do not here describe Resolution 1695, which was somewhat unusual in structure. S.C. Res. 1695 
(Jul. 15, 2006).  
48  S.C. Res. 1874, ¶ 18 (June 12, 2009); see also id. at ¶ 20 (applying the same standard to trade credits); 
id. at ¶ 28 (applying the same standard for training). 
49  S.C. Res. 2094, supra note 25, at ¶ 11. It also made binding an earlier non-binding provision 
regarding trade credits. Id. at ¶ 15. It further included a number of hortatory provisions regarding 
the prohibition of banking relationships, id. at ¶ 12, and the opening of representative offices, id. at 
¶ 13, if the state had information that provided reasonable grounds to believe that these activities 
could contribute to the DPRK’s prohibited activities. Unlike other ‘reasonable grounds’ type 
provisions, these were risk-based in that the question was not whether there was sufficient 
information to conclude that certain facts were true at the present, but whether there was a 
sufficient predicate to make a probability (risk) assessment. 
50  S.C. Res. 2270, supra note 25, at ¶ 8 (regarding items that could contribute to development of 
operational capabilities of DPRK armed forces); id. at ¶ 27 (regarding items that could contribute 
to WMD or missile programs). The resolution also requires states to close representative offices, 
subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK if the state has credible information that provides 
reasonable grounds to believe these financial services could contribute to the DPRK’s prohibited 
activities. Id. at ¶ 35; see also id. at ¶ 17 (requiring states to prohibit training of DPRK nationals that 
could contribute to proliferation sensitive activities); id. at ¶ 36 (prohibiting public or private 
financial support that could contribute to prohibited activities). 
51  Id. at ¶ 8. There is an exception to this catch-all if the state further determines that the item would 
be exclusively for livelihood purposes. Id. An even more recent resolution, Resolution 2321, picked 
up on the precedent set by Resolution 2270 and provided for the imposition of certain measures 
unless the State determines that there is no risk. S.C. Res. 2321, ¶ 11 (Nov. 30, 2016) (emphasis 
added). That is, states are required to suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons 
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Measures of this form are not limited to the DPRK context. For instance, in 
Resolution 1929, the Council prohibited the transfer of items to Iran “if the State 
determine[d] they could contribute” to enrichment52 and prohibited the provision 
of financial services if the state had reasonable grounds to believe they could 
contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.53 
These resolutions not only are using risk, but using risk in different ways. A 
prohibition on transactions that pose a sufficient risk of contributing to prohibited 
programs relies on risk to impose a substantive obligation. Resolution 2270, on 
the other hand, which speaks of determinations regarding the sale or supply of 
certain items, is at least suggestive of a potential role for risk assessment 
procedures.54 
More broadly, the Security Council has increasingly imposed similar (albeit 
less reticulated) prevention and due diligence obligations on states with respect to 
terrorist financing. Thus, for instance, Resolution 1373 requires states to prevent 
and suppress the financing of terrorist acts.55 Likewise, in the context of the Al 
Qaeda/ISIL asset freeze, states are required to prevent their nationals, individuals, 
and entities within their territory from making funds, financial assets, or economic 
resources available to designated individuals or entities.56 As one commentator has 
put it: 
Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, states focused their compliance with the 
Terrorism Suppression Conventions almost exclusively on criminal law 
enforcement. . . . [I]ts application to terrorist offence is post facto and therefore 
not strictly preventive. Following 9/11 with the adoption of Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (2001) . . . states began to report on measures taken to 
prevent terrorists from gaining access to funds or from using their territories 
as a base of operations or indoctrination.57 
                                                 
sponsored by or representing the DPRK unless “the State engaging in scientific or technical 
cooperation determines that the particular activity will not contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation 
sensitive nuclear activities or ballistic missile-related programmes.” Id. at ¶ 11(b) (emphasis added).  
52  S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 25, at ¶ 13. 
53  Id. at ¶ 21; see also id., at ¶¶ 23, 24. 
54  The exact import of this provision is not entirely clear—it could mean that states must make 
determinations (a procedural obligation) or the making of such a determination could trigger the 
obligation to prohibit the transaction (a substantive obligation) or some combination thereof. 
55  S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(a) (Sept. 28, 2001). 
56  S.C. Res. 2253, supra note 43, at ¶ 2(a). The Security Council took a similar approach in Resolution 
2178 on Foreign Terrorist Fighters, imposing not only a criminalization obligation, but also a 
prevention obligation. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 44, at ¶ 5. 
57  KIMBERLEY M. TRAPP, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 76 (2011). There 
are limited risk-based provisions in some of the terrorism conventions. See, for example, International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, art. 18(1)(b), Dec. 9, 1999, G.A. 
Res. 54/109, 39 I.L.M. 270. 
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My argument in this Section is not that this trend in Security Council 
sanctions practice means it has abandoned other tools. Of course, blunter 
approaches remain in the Security Council’s arsenal. Thus, for instance, 
Resolution 2371 prohibited all trade with the DPRK in certain sectors (including, 
for instance, coal and iron). And, Resolution 2375 extended those prohibitions to 
natural gas and textiles, and imposed a cap on the amount of refined petroleum 
that could be sold to the DPRK. Indeed, as the crisis regarding the DPRK has 
deepened, and in particular in light of the way in which all sectors of the DPRK 
economy have some relationship to the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile 
programs, risk-mitigation measures may be insufficient. Rather, my argument here 
is that the Council has begun to use risk-based tools in its sanctions practice; and 
the Council will surely use them again in addressing threats for which they are 
appropriate.58 
B.  Protection of Civil ians  
In this Section, I turn next to a second area of recent Security Council 
practice that has relied on risk assessments: protection of civilians mandates. In 
general, unlike the sanctions regimes I described in the prior Section, pursuant to 
which the Council imposed obligations on states where there was sufficient risk, 
these examples are of authorizations to take action on the basis of risk.59 
Historically, peacekeepers were expected to respond to outbreaks of 
violence when they occurred. The Brahimi report, for instance, suggested 
peacekeepers should be authorized to respond when they “witness violence 
against civilians.”60 More recently, however, peacekeeping missions with 
protection-of-civilians mandates have been expected to analyze threats and 
prevent them from materializing. 
Protection of civilians mandates are more and more common in 
contemporary peacekeeping missions,61 often taking the form of an authorization 
                                                 
58  Cf. Section V.A, infra. 
59  Cf. Scott Sheeran & Catherine Kent, Protection of Civilians, Responsibility to Protect, and Humanitarian 
Intervention: Conceptual and Normative Interactions, in PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS 29, 56 (Haidi Willmot 
et al. eds., 2016) (“[W]hile mandates provide a right to use force, whether they imply an obligation as 
such is unclear.”); Siobhan Wills, International Responsibility for Ensuring the Protection of Civilians, in 
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS, supra, at 224, 228–31. The U.N.’s human rights due diligence policy is 
an example of risk giving rise to an obligation in a related area. 
60  See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, ¶ 62, U.N. Doc. 
A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000); see also S.C. Pres. Statement 1999/6 (Feb. 12, 1999). 
61  Sheeran & Kent, supra note 59, at 42 (“A critical development in U.N. peacekeeping since the late 
1990s has been the inclusion of the use of force to protect civilians as a mission task.”). The first 
peacekeeping mission to have such a mandate was the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone in 1999. As of 
2016, fourteen missions had such a mandate. Id. at 44. 
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to use force to protect (without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the 
territorial state) “civilians under threat of physical violence.”62 The way the 
Council has glossed such mandates makes clear that in the sense used here, 
“threat” is risk-based. For instance, the United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stability Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has been tasked with stabilizing 
“areas where civilians are at risk,” and protection of civilians is defined to include 
“active and effective patrolling in areas where civilians are at risk.”63 Likewise, the 
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has been mandated to identify 
threats against civilians “in areas at high risk.”64 
U.N. doctrine documents confirm this. The 2011 Framework for Drafting 
Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in U.N. Peacekeeping 
Operations counseled “[a]rticulat[ing] actual and potential POC risks in the 
mission area.”65 Likewise, a Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations/Department of Field Support policy document speaks of “[f]orward-
looking threat and risk assessment [that] will enable the mission to anticipate and 
prevent violence before it occurs.”66 
Beyond U.N. peacekeeping, the Security Council has also authorized states 
to use force in Libya where civilians were under threat of attack.67 And, the U.N. 
has promulgated a human rights due diligence policy that provides that where 
U.N. entities are contemplating support to non-U.N. security forces, they must 
make an “assessment of the risks”68 and must not provide support under certain 
conditions. 
                                                 
62  See, for example, S.C. Res. 2295, ¶ 19(c)(1) (June 29, 2016); S.C. Res. 2327, ¶ 7(a)(1) (Dec. 16, 2016); 
S.C. Res. 2301, ¶ 33(a)(i) (July 26, 2016). 
63  S.C. Res. 2295, supra note 62, at ¶ 19(c)(ii). 
64  S.C. Res. 2327, supra note 62, at ¶ 7(a)(ii); see also S.C. Res. 2301, supra note 62, at ¶ 33(a)(i) (“To 
protect . . . at risk communities, while mitigating risks to civilians posed by its military and police 
operations.”); S.C. Res. 2348, ¶ 34(i)(b) (Mar. 31, 2017) (“[I]dentify[ing] threats to civilians and 
implement[ing] existing prevention and response plans . . .”) (emphasis added). 
65  U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Framework for Drafting 
Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (POC) Strategies in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1 (2011), 
https://perma.cc/M6VB-QEDX. 
66  U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, The Protection of 
Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, ¶ 34 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://perma.cc/C73U-YHKX; see 
also Rep. of the Indep. High-Level Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, Uniting Our Strengths for 
Peace—Politics, Partnership and People, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. A/70/95–S/2015/446 (June 17, 2015).  
67  S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing force “to protect civilians and civilian populated 
areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”). 
68  U.N. Secretary-General, Identical Letters Dated Feb. 25, 2013 from the Secretary-General 
Addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to the President of the Security Council, 
annex I ¶ 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/67775–S/2013/110 (Mar. 5, 2013); id. at ¶ 14(f). 
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But the Council has not only considered the question of whether to apply 
risk-based standards, and not only used risk to create both obligations (sanctions) 
and authorizations (protection of civilians), but has also had to wrestle with the 
question of how to scope risk analysis. That is, the Council has had to consider 
the question, “what risk”—posed by whom and to whom—“should matter.” Here, 
again, protection of civilians is a useful lens. For instance, there has long been a 
robust debate regarding how to address risk to civilians posed by the host 
government. The U.N. Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), for example, was 
authorized to use force to protect civilians, in particular from the use of heavy 
weapons.69 This “effectively . . . allowed for much greater intervention by the U.N. 
mission in the conflict” against outgoing President Gbagbo, who refused to 
relinquish power.70 We have also recently begun to see discussion of risk to whom, 
beyond simply civilians. Thus, for instance, Resolution 2304 also called for the 
regional protection force in South Sudan to respond to potential attacks against 
international and national humanitarian actors.71 
III.  THE BIRTH OF RISK-BASED INTERNATIONAL LAW  
The Security Council practice I have described is only the tip of the iceberg. 
In this Part, I take a step back and offer a brief (and necessarily not exhaustive) 
history of risk analysis, principally through the lens of the work of the 
International Law Commission (ILC), focusing in particular on prevention and 
due diligence. In Section IV, I show how this evolving practice has culminated in 
the broad use of risk, in various ways, across various areas of law. 
Early on, risk principally arose in two contexts. The first was state 
responsibility for harm to foreign nationals (as courts and tribunals wrestled with 
whether states had done enough to prevent such harm, that is, whether they had 
exercised due diligence in implementing a proto-prevention rule72). The second 
was states’ authority to address threats, for instance when neutral states failed 
during armed conflict adequately to mitigate the risk of belligerent behavior in 
their waters. In both cases, although the relevant rules appeared facially to speak 
to a state’s prevention obligations, they essentially functioned as authorizations. 
That is, state responsibility for harm to foreign nationals fundamentally focused 
on the question of whether the state of nationality was entitled to bring a claim 
against the territorial state. Likewise, the law of neutrality was most concerned 
                                                 
69  S.C. Res. 1975, ¶ 6 (Mar. 30, 2011). 
70  Wills, supra note 59, at 230. 
71  S.C. Res. 2304, ¶ 10(c) (Aug. 12, 2016). 
72  See Koivurova, supra note 19, at ¶ 4 (“[A] State could be held responsible if it was manifestly 
negligent, i.e. failed to exercise due diligence in trying to prevent, redress or punish the damage to 
the alien.”). I call it “proto-prevention” since much of the focus was in fact ex post rather than ex 
ante. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 610 Vol. 18 No. 2 
with whether, based on the threat presented by a belligerent operating in neutral 
waters, another belligerent should be authorized to use force despite the fact that 
force was being used on neutral territory. These two early examples of risk analysis 
differed, however, in that the risk element in the doctrine of state responsibility 
was at least in part assessed in more categorical terms, whereas the law of neutrality 
prescribed a more case-by-case approach. 
During a second phase, which coincided with the ILC’s early work on state 
responsibility as currently conceived (i.e., not limited to harm to foreign nationals), 
risk analysis began to be applied more broadly (that is, to additional areas of law). 
But the dominant paradigm remained one of risk as authorization, and prevention 
qua prevention was subordinate to the question of whether a claim could be 
brought for failure to exercise due diligence. During a third phase, however, risk 
as obligation began fully to emerge with a focus on prevention of transboundary 
harm (and, more broadly, the development of international environmental law).73 
At the same time, risk as authorization became perhaps less salient. During this 
phase, there was frequent resort to procedural obligations (such as an obligation 
to conduct an environmental impact assessment), which differed from earlier 
more substantive risk authorizations. I trace each of these three phases in the 
Sections that follow. 
A.  Phase 1: Early Due Diligence—State Responsibil i ty and 
Neutrali ty  
In this Section, I describe the early uses of risk analysis and make the case 
that the focus of risk analysis was on when and whether a state was authorized to 
act—whether to bring a claim or to use force. This origin story is twofold. The 
first part concerns the early law of state responsibility for harm to foreign 
nationals,74 and in particular whether the lack of due diligence by one state 
permitted another state to pursue a claim against it, and the second part concerns 
the law of neutrality.75 I will describe each in turn. 
The paradigmatic example of a claim predicated upon harm by private 
citizens to a state’s national was where the territorial state failed to offer justice in 
                                                 
73  In part, this is the story of how due diligence in the context of state responsibility shifted from 
being a way to attribute conduct to a state to a primary norm of conduct. Cf. Koivurova, supra note 
19, at ¶¶ 5–6. 
74  ILA Study Group, First Report, supra note 29, at 3 (“During the 19th and 20th centuries, due diligence 
had particular relevance in the context of the protection of aliens.”). 
75  As Justice Moore said in the S.S. Lotus Case, as early as 1927, “[i]t [was] well settled that a State [was] 
bound to use due diligence to prevent the commission within its dominions of criminal acts against 
another nation or its people.” The Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 269 (Sept. 7, 1927), https://perma.cc/A9JA-RQRP. 
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the wake of the harm.76 Thus, for instance, in a claim brought by a U.S. national 
arising from the death of her husband and son in Mexico, Mexico was found liable 
“by its failure to put the perpetrators to justice.”77 This was not risk-based.78 
But this was not the only question relevant to such inter-state claims. Also 
relevant were: (1) whether the territorial state knew of a risk to the foreign 
national79; and (2) whether the territorial state had the capacity to address the risk. 
These were more risk-based, although the former only insofar as knowledge could 
                                                 
76  As Dr. Robert Barnidge has put it, “[t]he Janes claim [which was based on failure to respond to 
murders of Americans] ‘may be considered as the prototype.’” Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., The Due 
Diligence Principle Under International Law, 8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 81, 93 (2006) (citing Janes v. 
United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.IA.A. 82 (1925)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cf. 
id. at 94 (labeling this the “nonrepression” theory). See also Clyde Eagleton, Denial of Justice in 
International Law, 22 AM. J. INT’L L. 538, 540 (1928); F.V. García Amador (Special Rapporteur on 
State Responsibility), Rep. on International Responsibility, 173, 222, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/96 (Jan. 20, 
1956) (quoting the Sub-Committee report of the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the 
Progressive Codification of International Law) [hereinafter García Amador, First Rep.]. For instance, 
the Harvard Draft Convention on Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their Territory to 
the Person or Property of Foreigners stated that state responsibility may be incurred where the state 
failed to prevent injury and “local remedies have been exhausted without adequate redress.” Edwin 
M. Borchard, The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their Territory to the Person or Property 
of Foreigners, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 131, 134 (1929). 
77  KULESZA, supra note 29, at 66. Many of the seminal cases of the U.S.-Mexico Claims Commission 
concerned this kind of “denial of justice.” Edwin M. Borchard, Important Decisions of the Mixed Claims 
Commission United States and Mexico, 21 AM. J. INT’L L. 516, 521 (1927). For a good example in another 
context, see Poggioli (It. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 669 (1903), in which the umpire concluded that 
Venezuela was responsible where “the local government failed to take ordinary and necessary 
precautions and allowed the offenses complained of to go unpunished after becoming known.” Id. 
at 690. See also KULESZA, supra note 29, at 69 (discussing Poggioli and describing “the inaction of state 
bodies resulting in a gross denial of justice”). 
78  In this regard, I am not fully persuaded by the characterization by the International Law Association 
that the U.S.-Mexico Claims Commission articulated a set of objective factors to be taken into 
account in determining the content of the due diligence obligation. ILA Study Group, First Report, 
supra note 29, at 3. 
79  Thus, for instance, in Boyd v. United Mexican States (U.S.-Mex.), 4 REP. OF INT’L ARBITRAL 
AWARDS (1928), the U.S.-Mexico Commission relied in finding Mexico not liable on the fact that 
only minor crime had occurred before bandits shot and killed an American national, and no 
complaint of lack of protection had earlier been made to the Mexican government. Id. at 380. That 
is, under those circumstances, Mexico might not have known of the risk. By contrast, in Chapman 
v. United Mexican States (U.S.-Mex.), 4 REP. OF INT’L ARBITRAL AWARDS 632 (1930), a case where 
the Commission found Mexico liable, the Commission emphasized that the U.S. national who 
suffered harm had warned the Mexican government, but no Mexican official “had manifested more 
than a passing interest.” Id. at 633. Cf. Barnidge, supra note 76, at 96 (discussing a case where 
“Mexico had knowledge . . . [and how that] likely figured into the General Claims Commission’s 
calculus in reaching a finding of state responsibility”). 
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be constructive knowledge (since where the territorial state was explicitly warned 
of a credible threat, there was very little risk assessment for the state to make).80 
The question of state capacity as a basis for claims is perhaps most 
interesting for these purposes. In the British Claims in Morocco81 case, for instance, 
the arbitrator focused on what the territorial state could reasonably achieve.82 As 
Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi has explained, by these lights the due diligence rule at 
the time concerned “possessing, on a permanent basis, a legal and administrative 
apparatus normally able to guarantee respect for the international norm on 
prevention.”83 As another author pointed out at the time, the early doctrine of 
protection of nationals was “ultimately concerned with the possibility of 
maintaining a unified economic and social order for the conduct of international 
trade and intercourse among independent political units.”84 
Thus, insofar as risk featured in the early law of due diligence regarding 
protection of nationals, it was with respect to the risk of general lawlessness, or, 
occasionally, as proof of indirect knowledge. This was categorical risk assessment, 
in the sense that the question was whether the territorial state had structures in 
place to address kinds of risk (for example, crime). The law was little concerned 
with the specifics of individual cases. The focus, moreover, remained principally 
upon whether there were adequate local remedies.85 As a consequence, risk 
ultimately played an authorizing function—that is, the existence of risk, often 
coupled with a failure to address the consequences of its materialization, 
authorized a state to make claims. There was little attention paid to the contours 
of states’ prevention obligations. 
I will turn now to the law of neutrality. I contend that risk in this area of law 
was considered more contextually, but again it provided authorization for states 
                                                 
80  Cf. Case Concerning the Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 18–21 (Apr. 
9). 
81  Gr. Brit. v. Morocco, 2 R.I.A.A. 620 (2006) [hereinafter British Claims in Morocco]. 
82  See id. at 644 (the rule “offre en fait aux États, pour leurs ressortissants, le degré de sécurité auquel 
ils peuvent raisonnablement s’attendre” [the rule offers in fact to states, for their nationals abroad, 
the degree of security they could reasonably expect]); see also Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due 
Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States, 35 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 9, 27 (1992). 
Cf. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 
Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶¶ 65–66 (May 24) (comparing Iran’s response to what it had done 
some months before in a comparable situation).  
83  Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 82, at 26 (citing Gr. Brit. v. Morocco, supra note 81). 
84  FREDERICK S. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS: A STUDY IN THE APPLICATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1932). 
85  García Amador, First Rep., supra note 76, at 204 (calling exhaustion “[o]ne of the principles most 
firmly laid down in international law”). This preoccupation was driven by the view that wrongful 
acts were seen to “damage interests which, in the final analysis, vest in the State exclusively.” Id. at 
181. 
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to act. The focus was not on what states were expected to do to address risk. The 
seminal early case in the law of neutrality was the Alabama Claims Arbitration of 
1872. These claims involved British failure to halt construction of vessels that 
were armed and used by the Confederacy during the U.S. Civil War, despite U.S. 
warnings of the risk these vessels’ construction posed. The Treaty of Washington, 
which established the arbitral tribunal that decided these claims, reflected 
agreement by the parties that a neutral state was expected to use due diligence to 
prevent the fitting out of a vessel it had reasonable grounds to believe was 
intended to cruise or carry out war.86 The tribunal went on to hold the U.K. liable, 
relying in part on the warnings the U.S. had offered.87 The tribunal specifically 
concluded that “‘due diligence’ . . . ought to be exercised by neutral governments 
in exact proportion to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be exposed, 
from a failure to fulfil [sic] the obligations of neutrality on their part.”88 Thus, the 
tribunal appeared to require that a neutral government assess on a case-by-case 
basis the risk posed by particular activities. Subsequent treaties included language 
to similar effect.89 
But the law of neutrality was actually little concerned with glossing ex ante 
what a state was required to do to fulfill those obligations—characterized as a 
“comparatively simple duty”90—and instead often focused on whether a 
belligerent was justified in taking action against an opposing vessel in a neutral’s 
territorial waters on the basis of the threat it presented where the neutral had failed 
                                                 
86  THOMAS WILLING BALCH, THE ALABAMA ARBITRATION 119 (1900). The U.K. asserted that it did 
not accept that these principles reflected international law, but for purposes of friendly resolution 
of the Alabama Claims, the Tribunal should proceed as if they did. Id. at 120. 
87  Id. at 130 (“[I]t omitted, notwithstanding the warnings and official representations made by the 
diplomatic agents of the United States during the construction of the said number ‘290,’ to take in 
due time any effective measures of prevention.”). 
88  U.S. v. Gr. Brit., 29 R.I.A.A. 125, 129 (2012). 
89  Both the Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons 
in Case of War on Land art. 5, Oct. 28, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 Bevans 654, and the Hague 
Convention (XIII) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War art. 25, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, 1 Bevans 723, included due diligence obligations. See also Hague Convention 
(XIII), supra, at art. 8 (“A neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent . . . 
the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise, or to engage in hostile 
operations.”) (emphasis added); Ashley Deeks, ‘Unwilling or Unable’: Toward a Normative Framework 
for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 498 (2012). 
90  ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 228 (1955). 
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to execute its duties.91 Norway’s investigation of the Altmark, and the U.K. action 
against that vessel, are good examples of this.92 
Thus, as one commentator has put it more generally, during the League of 
Nations period—and indeed, I would say, through World War II—there was 
“little attention given to prevention.”93 Rather, to the extent risk arose, it arose 
principally in the context of substantive rules regarding authorization to take 
particular actions (whether with respect to claims or the use of force) on the basis 
of a failure to exercise due diligence or the resulting threat. In the next Section, I 
describe how the role risk played remained roughly similar through World War II 
and the post-war period in the sense that risk generally functioned as an 
authorization; I also demonstrate, however, how a predicate was being laid to 
risk’s expansion, both with respect to its role and with respect to a broadening of 
the areas of law to which it was relevant. 
B.  Phase 2:  Trail Smelter  and the ILC’s Initial Work on Modern 
State Responsibil ity  
In this Section, I trace the story of due diligence through the World War II 
and post-war periods. This period is one of transition in that risk’s role remained 
relatively static but two developments laid the groundwork for the subsequent 
dramatic expansion of risk’s relevance to international law. Starting with the latter, 
the two key developments were: (1) the focus of state responsibility broadened, 
beyond exclusively harm to foreign nationals94 and to include transboundary harm, 
as well as harm caused by non-state actors over which a state exercised sufficient 
control; and (2) increasing attention was paid to the quantum of harm (as had been 
the case with respect to neutrality doctrine), which started a more robust 
conversation about how to assess harm (and, ultimately, the risk thereof). 
Nevertheless, while risk began to feature more prominently, risk remained 
principally relevant with respect to questions of whether a state was authorized to 
act. 
The first major change of this period was that due diligence mattered in areas 
of law beyond injury to foreign nationals. Perhaps the most prominent reflection 
                                                 
91  Id. at 220, 220 n.55 (noting that “a neutral state is not an insurer of fulfilment of its neutral duties” 
and arguing for the rights of a belligerent to take action in the event such duties are not fulfilled); 
id. at 226 & 226 n.68 (noting that the law “fails to indicate with precision the character and scope 
of the preventive obligation”); see also id. at 223 (discussing the situation where the neutral made 
appropriate efforts—but was unable ultimately—to suppress the threat posed by the vessel). 
92  Id. at 237–38, 237–39 n. 87. 
93  KULESZA, supra note 29, at 120. 
94  Cf. id. at 120 (discussing League of Nations work as “limited to damages done to foreigners”). 
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of this is the Trail Smelter case.95 That case concerned transboundary harm. 
Likewise, within the ILC in the early 1960s, there was robust debate about whether 
state responsibility should be made broader than the question of responsibility for 
harm to non-citizens96 (and of course it was). Coupled with this subject-matter 
expansion, there was increasing focus on state support to non-state actors and 
when that should trigger state responsibility (as opposed simply to when it should 
be triggered by direct state action or state inaction). For instance, one author cites 
a Soviet complaint to the U.S. about the activities of anti-Castro forces in Cuba 
who were alleged to have shelled a Soviet merchant ship.97 This line of logic 
ultimately (albeit later) culminated in the ICJ’s Nicaragua case, in which the court 
focused on whether the U.S. exercised “effective control” of the contras for 
purposes of state responsibility.98 These two developments opened the aperture 
with respect to what and whose risks were relevant. 
The second major change was that attention was increasingly being paid to 
how to understand harm. Thus, while Trail Smelter is often cited in discussion of 
prevention of transboundary harm, the tribunal essentially assumed potential state 
responsibility for injurious acts by private parties.99 Instead, its focus was on the 
definition of an injurious act.100 Indeed, the tribunal’s famous pronouncement is 
that the injury must be “of serious consequences and . . . established by clear and 
convincing evidence.”101 This effected an important shift in focus from the 
conduct of the state alone to the harm. It was a predicate to a more robust use of 
risk analysis, which often requires understanding likely harm, and not just what a 
state did or did not do. 
                                                 
95  Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (2006). 
96  Roberto Ago (Chairman of the Sub-Committee on State Responsibility), Rep. on State Responsibility, 
[1963] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 253, UN Doc. A/CN.4/152 (Jan. 16, 1963). 
97  Barnidge, supra note 76, at 109. 
98  Military & Paramilitary Activities in & Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27). See generally Oona A. Hathaway et al., Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article 
1 and State Responsibility for Non-State Actors, 51 TEX. L. REV. 539, 549 (2017). 
99  Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton, Strict Liability in International Environmental Law, in LAW OF THE 
SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A. 
MENSAH 1131, 1131 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007) (“The arbitral agreement 
itself recognized the responsibility of a State for the acts of non-State actors as well as those of the 
State or its organs.”). 
100  Trail Smelter, supra note 95, at 1963 (“[T]he real difficulty often arises rather when it comes to 
determine what . . . is deemed to constitute an injurious act.”). 
101  Id. at 1965. Cf. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Of Paradoxes, Precedents, & Progeny: The Trail Smelter Arbitration 
65 Years Later, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL 
SMELTER ARBITRATION 34, 38 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006) (“The U.S. 
view seems to have been that if ‘fumigations’ sufficient to cause injury continued to occur in 
Washington, the United States would have grounds for complaint, no matter what remedial works 
had been installed by the company, and regardless of their effect.”). 
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Despite these changes, risk analysis remained principally a source of 
authorization—and not just under the law of neutrality (although that continued 
to be an important focus102). For example, while the theory of defense of nationals 
was debated by this point, any right to use force that was recognized was seen not 
as arising from a breach of an obligation, but rather as the exercise of a right.103 
Similarly, a focus on authorization continued to characterize the discussion of 
state responsibility.104 Indeed, the very use of the term “responsibility” in the ILC’s 
papers was initially understood to mean the consequence of unlawful conduct 
(whereas “liability” described a primary obligation).105 
Another element of continuity is that risk continued to be considered 
generally (facially) under a variety of circumstances, rather than on a case-by-case 
basis. Thus, F.V. García Amador (the ILC’s first special rapporteur on state 
responsibility) characterized what was at issue in Trail Smelter as a breach of a 
general duty “implicit in the function of the State . . . namely, the duty to ensure 
                                                 
102  A key development during this period was the U.S. use of force in Cambodia. See generally STEPHEN 
C. NEFF, THE RIGHTS & DUTIES OF NEUTRALS: A GENERAL HISTORY 211–12 (2000) (discussing 
this as an example of the invocation of self-defense). Then-State Department Legal Adviser John 
Stevenson explained that the North Vietnamese had used Cambodian territory for attacks against 
South Vietnam and that while the Cambodian government had made some effort to suppress these 
attacks, they had failed to accomplish this end. Stevenson then said that where compensation for 
breach of a neutral’s duties would not be sufficient, “the injured belligerent has the right of self-
help or, at a minimum, the right to exercise such self-help consistent with the right of self-defense.” 
John R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Statement to the N.Y.C. Bar Association on 
Legal Aspects of U.S. Military Action in Cambodia (May 28, 1970), https://perma.cc/W6N4-
6UDS. In some sense, this could be considered a remedy for breach of a risk obligation.  But the 
focus was sufficiently squarely on when a state was authorized to take action, that I classify this as 
risk as authorization. Cf. supra note 30. 
103  D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 90 (1958). As Bowett has remarked, “the 
essence of action in self-defence is that it should be a measure of protection, not punishment.” Id. 
at 99. Indeed, the view was taken that before seeking to take action to protect nationals, a state 
must exhaust local remedies. Kristen E. Eichensehr, Note, Defending Nationals Abroad: Assessing the 
Lawfulness of Forcible Hostage Rescues, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 452, 472 (2008). Exhaustion requirements tend 
to deflect attention from what a state is expected to do ex ante and keep the focus on the 
circumstances under which another state is authorized to take action. See supra Section III(A). 
104  The first draft articles continued to focus on the question of local remedies (and hence authorization 
to bring claims). See F.V. García Amador (Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), Second Rep. 
on International Responsibility, 105, UN Doc. A/CN.4/106 (Feb. 15, 1957); see also Roberto Ago 
(Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility), First Rep. on State Responsibility, 143, 145, [1969] 2 Y.B. 
Int’l L. Comm’n 125, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217 (May 7, 1969) (discussing the 1961 revised Harvard 
Draft Convention on Responsibility of States for Damage Done in their Territory to the Person or 
Property of Foreigners, which suggested that due diligence was only breached if the territorial state 
failed to apprehend the non-state actor who caused injury).  
105  Julio Barboza (Special Rapporteur on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising 
out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law), Second Rep. on International Liability for Injurious 
Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 145, UN Doc. A/CN.4/402 (May 
13, 1986). This understanding subsequently shifted. Id. at 146. 
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that in its territory conditions prevail which guarantee the safety of persons and 
property.”106 Likewise, the prevention obligations of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations with respect to the inviolability of diplomatic missions and 
personnel were little considered107 until a subsequent rash of kidnappings and 
hostage takings prompted the General Assembly to adopt a new Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. Even that latter Convention focused 
principally on criminalization (akin to the earlier debate about whether the 
territorial state had seen justice done for crimes against a foreign national), rather 
than setting forth a more detailed set of risk-based obligations. This is also the 
period when there is considerable growth in treaty-based investment 
protections.108 Many such treaties included a requirement that “[i]nvestment shall 
. . . enjoy full protection and security.”109 During the immediately post-war period, 
this was generally seen as protection against risks of an unfair legal system.110 
Thus, the role risk played remained relatively static. But as the scope of 
legally-relevant risk broadened, and as harm increasingly came into focus, the way 
was cleared for risk to play new legally-relevant roles. In the next Section, I turn 
to those developments. 
C. The Rise of Risk as Obligation  
In this Section, I outline how risk began playing different roles beginning 
roughly in 1970, when the ILC inaugurated its work on international liability for 
injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law. In 
particular, this period was marked by a flowering of risk as obligation, as opposed 
to authorization, by virtue of a sustained focus on what prevention rules entail 
when married with a due diligence standard. Risk also began to give rise to 
procedural obligations and was considered more frequently on a case-by-case rather 
than categorical basis (although case-by-case analysis was not always a deep look). 
At the same time, through roughly 2001, while the question of which risks 
were relevant continued to receive ever more expansive answers (for instance, 
                                                 
106  García Amador, Second Rep., supra note 104, at 106. 
107  EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC 
RELATIONS 258 (2016); see also Ignatiev v. United States, 238 F.3d. 464 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
108  Cf. ILA Study Group, First Report, supra note 29, at 6 (linking due diligence to investment law); George 
K. Foster, Recovering ‘Protection and Security’: The Treaty Standard’s Obscure Origins, Forgotten Meaning, and 
Key Current Significance, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 1095, 1126 (2012) (linking this to the protection 
of aliens doctrine and discussing Mexico-U.S. Mixed Claims Commission cases). 
109  Foster, supra note 108, at 1097. 
110  Id. at 1133 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 6565, COMMERCIAL TREATY PROGRAM OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1958)). 
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private actions, and not just those of which the state had knowledge or that the 
state supported, were deemed to present legally relevant risks), with respect to 
subject matter, risk analysis stayed in a somewhat narrow lane (generally 
transboundary environmental harm). Likewise, while risk-based law began to 
move slightly away from the dyadic paradigm-which had, to a certain extent, 
flowed from the concept of risk as claims-authorization111-the conversation about 
which risk bearers were relevant was only just beginning. 
To illustrate these trends, in this Section I focus in particular on the evolution 
of the law governing transboundary harm (and related developments with regard 
to due diligence and prevention), the development of the precautionary approach 
(and its treatment in litigation, in particular before the ICJ, the WTO Appellate 
Body, and the ITLOS), and debate regarding the defense of nationals. This is 
necessarily something of a sketch, given the vast literature on the first two topics 
in particular. 
Perhaps the most important development—and certainly the first—was 
that, in 1970, the ILC divided its project on state responsibility into state 
responsibility and “risk liability,”112 which was understood to be a set of rules 
governing the relationship between states with respect to activities that might 
cause or had caused harm, but which were not internationally wrongful. A key 
difference between state responsibility and state liability was that state 
responsibility required wrongful conduct, but not necessarily harm, whereas state 
liability required harm (or at least a risk thereof), but not unlawful conduct.113 This 
                                                 
111  XUE HANQIN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2003); Catherine Tinker, 
State Responsibility and the Precautionary Principle, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTATION at 53, 54 (David Freestone & Ellen 
Hey eds., 1996) (discussing “the classic model, which poses a bilateral conflict between one state as 
actor and another state as victim, with significant physical harm occurring across national 
boundaries”); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
581 (2012) (discussing the view that “only states may invoke the responsibility of other states, and 
only when specially affected by the breach”); Roberto Ago (Special Rapporteur on State 
Responsibility), Second Rep. on State Responsibility, [1970] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 177, 184, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/233 (Apr. 20, 1970) (suggesting that a wrongful act gives rise to a right to reparation on 
the part of one specific state).  
112  Ago, Second Rep., supra note 111, at 178; see also Alan E. Boyle, State Responsibility and International 
Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: A Necessary Distinction?, 39 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 3 (1990). Cf. 1013th Meeting on State Responsibility, [1969] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 114, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/217 (noting the suggestion by some ILC members to address 
risk under the rubric of state responsibility, which Special Rapporteur Ago disclaimed in his first 
report). 
113  Mark A. Drumbl, Trail Smelter and the International Law Commission’s Work on State Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts and State Liability, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 101, at 85, 87 (“State liability differs from state responsibility insofar as it covers situations 
in which no illegal or unlawful conduct has occurred, although the conduct has triggered harm.”); 
Sompong Sucharitkul, State Responsibility and International Liability under International Law, 18 LOY. L.A. 
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greater focus on harm, and, indeed, risk of harm,114 as opposed to the attribution 
of wrongful conduct,115 opened the door significantly to risk analysis.116 As 
Gunther Handl has said, the ILC’s work exceeded “a study of reparation . . . [and 
began to cover] the management, in general, of transnational risks.”117 
                                                 
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 821, 834 (1996) (“Injury or damage is not an element of state responsibility” but 
“under international liability, there is no breach of a primary obligation if no appreciable harm or 
injurious consequence results.”). The theory at the time was that knowing transboundary harm 
might engage state responsibility, and so too might a breach of a state’s due diligence obligations to 
prevent harm. Cf. Gunther Handl, Trail Smelter in Contemporary International Environmental Law: Its 
Relevance in the Nuclear Energy Context, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 101, at 125, 130, 132 (“Trail Smelter suggests that any such effects [significant transboundary 
effects] would constitute internationally prohibited conduct[,]” and lack of due diligence “bears on 
whether there has been a breach of a state’s obligation entailing responsibility for the transboundary 
harm occasioned.”). But an accident would not, see Report of the International Law Commission on the Work 
of its Forty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/40/10, reprinted in [1993] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 24 (part 2) 
(“The Special Rapporteur explained that activities involving risk were chiefly those which may cause 
transboundary harm due to accidents.”). Gunther Handl points in particular to situations where 
there is a “[s]tatistical probability that given the nature of the activity concerned, harm will occur, 
reasonable precautionary measures notwithstanding.” Gunther Handl, Liability as an Obligation 
Established by a Primary Rule of International Law, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 49, 64 (1985). 
114  International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 
[1992] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 42, 51, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (“Attention should be focused at this 
stage on drafting articles in respect of activities having a risk of causing transboundary harm.”). One 
of the justifications for discussing risk was that states had not consented to assume certain risks 
emanating from conduct on the territory of their neighbors—unlike nationals affirmatively 
choosing to reside on the territory of a state other than their state of nationality. See Report of the 
Working Group on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by 
International Law, [1978] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 151, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.284 (“In the situations 
that fall within the present topic, there is no presumption of willingness to accept risks or harmful 
consequences because they are tolerated within the territory or control of the State in which those 
risks or harmful consequences arise.”) [hereinafter International Liability Working Group]; 
KULESZA, supra note 29, at 170 (“[T]here is no presumed consent of the state to take upon itself the 
risk of dangerous acts.”). 
115  Knowledge was not required. There was some discussion of whether the territorial state must have 
had “means of knowing” of the risk in order for the draft articles to apply. This proposal was 
primarily to shelter developing countries. Julio Barboza (Special Rapporteur on International 
Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law), 
Fourth Rep. on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by 
International Law, 262, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/413 (Apr. 6, 1988) (A “means of knowing” test has as 
“its primary aim . . . to protect developing countries, which sometimes lack the means to be aware 
of everything that goes on within their territory”). But this concept was ultimately rejected. Id. at 
263 (ultimately suggesting deletion of the test). 
116  The first draft articles identified the probability of harm as one of the relevant factors to balance in 
a proposed balancing test. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter (Special Rapporteur on International Liability 
for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law), Third Rep. 
on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 
64, § 6(1), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/360 (June 23, 1982). 
117  Handl, supra note 113, at 50. 
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The state liability project relied on risk to impose prevention-type 
obligations, in particular not to cause harm, or to mitigate the risk thereof.118 As 
Robert Quentin-Baxter, the ILC’s first special rapporteur on the subject, said, 
liability was meant as “a negative asset, an obligation, in contra-distinction to a 
right.”119 
The ILC also had long debates regarding how to assess risk, in particular 
how categorical or how contextual an approach should be taken. The ILC sought 
to establish a threshold of potential harm that would trigger application of what 
ultimately became draft articles on the prevention of transboundary harm (in other 
words, de minimis risk of harm was not foreseen as within the scope of coverage).120 
This led to questions regarding: whether risk should have a qualitative 
detectability;121 whether the ILC should promulgate a list of risky activities, which 
could then be periodically updated;122 and at what level of specificity risk should 
                                                 
118  Cf. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities and Commentaries Thereto, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 153 [hereinafter Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm] (“The State of origin shall 
take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize 
the risk thereof.”). 
119  Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter (Special Rapporteur on International Liability for Injurious 
Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law), First Rep. on International 
Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 250, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/334 (June 24, 1980) (emphasis added); see also Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter (Special 
Rapporteur on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not 
Prohibited by International Law), Fourth Rep. on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising 
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 213, UN Doc. A/CN.4/373 (June 27, 1983). 
120  The threshold ultimately chosen was “significant” risk. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary 
Harm, supra note 118, at 153 (“The State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent 
significant transboundary harm . . . .”); id. at 152 (“The obligations of prevention imposed on States 
are thus not only reasonable but also sufficiently limited so as not to impose such obligations in 
respect of virtually any activity.”).  
121  Before “significant risk” was chosen, Barboza had suggested that the standard be “appreciable risk,” 
which he defined as “of some magnitude and that it must be either clearly visible or easy to deduce 
from the properties of the things or materials used.” Julio Barboza (Special Rapporteur on 
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by 
International Law), Third Rep. on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not 
Prohibited by International Law, 56, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/405 (Mar. 16, 1987). The ILC debated whether 
this standard, which connotes detectability, should be preferred to “significant,” which connotes 
the quantum of risk. International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by 
International Law, [1989] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 83, 91–92, U.N. Doc. A/44/10 at 91–92. (The 
Special Rapporteur appeared to take the view that “appreciable” meant both detectable and 
significant. Julio Barboza (Special Rapporteur on International Liability for Injurious Consequences 
Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law), Sixth Rep. on International Liability for 
Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 88, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/428 
(Mar. 15, 1990).)  
122  Documents of the Thirty-Ninth Session, [1987] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 44, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1987. The draft Articles proposed by the Special Rapporteur in 1990 included an 
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be assessed (for example, at the level of an “activity” or as applied in particular 
circumstances).123 All of this evidenced a critical inquiry into whether to apply a 
contextual or categorical approach, and what each would mean.124 
Finally, while the draft articles the ILC ultimately proposed included a due 
diligence obligation with respect to the prevention of harm, the ILC’s work on 
risk assessment procedures was more detailed.125 Indeed, this period saw the 
                                                 
exemplary list of dangerous substances. Barboza, Sixth Rep., supra note 121, at 105. Cf. Julio Barboza 
(Special Rapporteur on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not 
Prohibited by International Law), Eighth Rep. on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising 
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 61, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/443 (Apr. 15, 1992) (“The 
Commission and the Sixth Committee did not prove receptive to the inclusion of such a concept 
or, consequently, to the resulting amendments.”). 
123  Barboza, Fourth Rep., supra note 115, at 256 (“[T]he risk must be general. In other words, it need 
not relate to specific cases, since our point of reference is no longer the act but the activity.”). 
Questions were also raised regarding whether certain activities should give rise to strict liability even 
where appropriate preventive measures were taken (because of the magnitude of the likely harm). 
Gunther Handl, State Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private Persons, 74 
AM. J. INT’L L. 525, 541 (1980) (“[T]he crucial element in a state’s original liability for private 
activities turns out to be the transnational significance of the risk.”); HANQIN, supra note 111, at 302 
(“[J]urists propose[d] that . . . strict liability should be imposed on States . . . when transboundary 
damage is caused by abnormally dangerous activities.”). Compare Barboza, Fourth Rep., supra note 
115, at 254 (suggesting a standard of “highly likely to cause transboundary injury”) (emphasis added), 
and Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of the Fortieth Session, 1988 2 Y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n 14, A/CN.4/SER.A/1988 (“The Special Rapporteur admitted that the concept of risk 
as defined in draft article 2 (a) did not seem to cover properly activities with low risk but with the 
potential of great harm.”), with Julio Barboza (Special Rapporteur on International Liability for 
Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law), Fifth Rep. on 
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, 134, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/423 (1989) (defining risk to include “both the low probability of very 
considerable [disastrous] transboundary harm and the high probability of minor appreciable harm”). 
Cf. Handl, Trail Smelter in Contemporary International Environmental Law, supra note 113, at 133 (“[T]he 
Tribunal’s decision does not directly cast a light on the status of threatened transboundary harms 
when the possible consequences are extremely serious but are low probability.”). 
124  Cf. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 118, at 149–50 (noting that the idea 
of a list had been rejected but that the word “activity” had been retained, which had been 
understood to be somewhat categorical). The ESPOO convention, on the other hand, includes a 
list of specific activities in its Appendix 1, Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context art. 1(3), Jan. 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 802 [hereinafter ESPOO Convention], 
and has procedures for identifying additional activities that should be subject by consent of the 
parties to the procedures of the convention, id. at art. 2(5).  
125  Compare Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 118, at 153 (draft article 3 is “in 
the nature of a statement of principle”), and id. at 155 (discussing different due diligence owed by 
states of differing levels of development), with id. at 157–66 (draft articles of a more procedural 
nature). Cf. Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao (Special Rapporteur on International Liability for Injurious 
Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law: Prevention of 
Transboundary Damage from Hazardous Activity), First Rep. on Prevention of Transboundary Damage 
from Hazardous Activities, 209–18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/487 (Mar. 18, 1998) (identifying precautions, 
which may also be procedural, polluter pays, which concerns liability not risk assessment, and 
equity, capacity, and good governance as the “substantive” principles underlying the enterprise). 
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inauguration of reticulated procedural obligations. Elements of the schematic 
outline that the ILC originally considered in its work on the topic were entirely 
procedural in nature.126 And, ultimately, commentators127 and the ILC began to 
focus on environmental impact assessments.128 As one commentator has put it, 
“[i]ncreasingly, the international legal community deals with the need to mitigate 
risks and prevent environmental harm through a sophisticated network of 
international procedural obligations.”129 
The focus on harm, and its prevention, not only reflected a turn to risk as 
obligation (rather than risk as authorization), but it also broadened the aperture to 
permit greater scrutiny of non-state actor conduct. That is, a greater set of risks 
became legally relevant. As Quentin-Baxter said in his first report, “[a] State within 
whose jurisdiction such an injury or danger is caused is not justified in refusing its 
co-operation upon the ground that the cause of the danger was not, or is not, 
                                                 
126  Quentin-Baxter, Third Rep., supra note 116, at 62–64. This is not surprising, since the core of the 
ILC’s early thinking on the subject had been that harm that might be caused by acts not prohibited 
by international law should generally be addressed by a balancing test. International Liability 
Working Group, supra note 114, at 151. The expectation was that states would agree on specific 
regimes to cover such activity. Quentin-Baxter, First Rep., supra note 119, at 250.  
127  Gunther Handl, The Principle of ‘Equitable Use’ As Applied to Internationally Shared Natural Resources: Its 
Role in Resolving Potential International Disputes Over Transfrontier Pollution, 14 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT 
INT’L 40, 56 (1978) (“In fact they [duties to negotiate] presuppose what might be called the ‘duty to 
make an environmental impact assessment.’”).  
128  As early as the Secretariat's study of 1984, the example of EIAs was discussed. Survey of State Practice 
Relevant to International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International 
Law, 12–13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/384 (Oct. 16, 1984). Some had, however, wished assessments to 
be undertaken in a more ‘objective’ manner. See, for example, Quentin-Baxter, Third Rep., supra note 
116, at 63, § 3(6)(a) (suggesting joint fact-finding); Barboza, Third Rep., supra note 121, at 50 
(asserting that where there are disagreements about risk, “the objective opinion of a third party is 
the only way out of the impasse”); Barboza, Fifth Rep., supra note 123, at 146–47. The ILC was not 
alone in coming to rely on environmental impact assessments or the like. See, for example, U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 206, Nov. 16, 1994, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397; ESPOO Convention, 
supra note 124, at art. 1(vi); id. at app. 2(d), 2(f) (discussing estimation and predictions). That said, 
the precise legal status of such procedural obligations under general international law remained 
uncertain, and the ICJ did not provide clear guidance on this point. See Erika L. Preiss, The 
International Obligation to Conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment: The ICJ Case Concerning the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 308 (1999) (“While the case presented the 
Court with an opportunity to establish clearly and advocate the many emerging doctrines of 
international environmental law, the majority of the Court declined to utilize it.”); Request for an 
Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 
December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1995 IC.J. Rep. 288, 342, 344 (Sept. 
22) (dissenting opinion of Weeramantry, J.). The ILC also focused considerable attention on a 
variety of other procedural obligations, such as notification rules, relying for instance on the seminal 
Lac Lanoux case in that regard. See Case Concerning Lac Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R.I.A.A. 281, 308 
(2006). 
129  CAROLINE E. FOSTER, SCIENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS: EXPERT EVIDENCE, BURDEN OF PROOF AND FINALITY 7 (2011). 
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within its knowledge or control.”130 Moreover, the ILC not only wrestled with the 
question of whose conduct should be covered, but also whose rights were 
implicated where harm occurred. This is the era of the ICJ’s decision in Barcelona 
Traction, in which the court appeared to move away from a necessarily dyadic, 
inter-state concept.131 While the ILC was hesitant to address general 
environmental risk,132 the issue had been joined, and it began to arise in other areas 
of risk-based law.133 It has continued to grow in prominence. 
Despite these profound advances, however, the ILC’s project remained 
tethered to a limited set of harms. For instance, the ILC explicitly restricted the 
coverage of its draft articles on prevention of transboundary harm to acts causing 
physical damage134 emanating from the territory or areas under the jurisdiction or 
control of another state.135 Even if not explicitly, the ILC’s work was also 
understood principally to concern environmental law.136 
The second significant development of the period was the explosive growth 
of the concept of precaution. This too fueled the rise of risk as procedural 
obligation, to be assessed contextually. There has been some question whether 
precaution should be understood to concern authorization137 or obligation138—
                                                 
130  Quentin-Baxter, First Rep., supra note 119, at 264. 
131  Case Concerning Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5) (“In view of the importance of the rights involved, all 
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.”); 
CRAWFORD, supra note 111, at 583; HANQIN, supra note 111, at 238. 
132  Barboza, Sixth Rep., supra note 121, at 101–02. 
133  Thus, for instance, the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) program began in the late 1970s and BITs 
differed from FCNs in that they generally permitted individuals to bring claims directly. Key 
provisions of BITs spoke to preventive actions that states should take with regard to the risk of 
violence. See Christoph Schreuer, Full Protection and Security, 1 J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 1, 2 
(2010) (citing Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech Republic (Neth. v. Czech), S.C.C. Case 088/2004, Partial 
Award, at 42–43 (2007)).  
134  Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 118, at 151 (noting “physical 
consequences”); see also Rao First Rep., supra note 125, at 194 (“[r]ejecting suggestions to expand the 
scope to include economic and social activities”); HANQIN, supra note 111, at 5 (“Th[e] first 
definitional element . . . serves to exclude activities which may cause consequential damage across 
a border, but not of a ‘physical’ character.”). 
135  Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 118, at 150–51; see also Rao, First Rep., 
supra note 125, at 197. 
136  Cf. Rao, First Rep., supra note 125, at 182. 
137  Peel, Precaution, supra note 21, at 491 (“One way of conceptualising what might be meant by 
precaution as an approach . . . is to say that it authorises or permits regulators to take precautionary 
measures in certain circumstances, without dictating a particular response in all cases.”). 
138  Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1028 (2003) (asserting 
that precaution is paralyzing because “it stands as an obstacle to regulation and nonregulation, and 
to everything in between”). But cf. John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 624 Vol. 18 No. 2 
that is, does uncertainty require states to regulate (or prohibit) risky activity or does 
uncertainty authorize states (despite countervailing norms) to promulgate such 
regulations (or prohibitions). But litigation during this period tended to reject 
precaution as authorization in favor of precaution as obligation.139 Thus, for 
instance, in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project the ICJ considered a 
claim that a state of ecological necessity, or “ecological risk,”140 excused abrogating 
a treaty. The Court concluded, however, that because the risk was insufficiently 
certain, it did not give rise to a state of necessity.141 Around the same time, the 
question of precaution as authorization was joined in litigation under the WTO 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which 
requires that WTO members ensure that measures “are based on an assessment . 
. . of the risks.”142 The U.S. and Canada challenged European prohibitions on 
importing beef from cows treated with certain growth hormones, arguing that 
European regulations had not relied on a risk assessment. The European 
Communities argued on the other hand that “[t]he precautionary principle is . . . 
a general customary rule of international law” and asserted that it permitted them 
to rely on the possibility of risk to regulate in advance of a full understanding of 
the risks of the hormones.143 The Appellate Body concluded that “the 
precautionary principle does not, by itself . . . relieve a panel from the duty of 
applying the normal (that is, customary international law) principle of treaty 
                                                 
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 15 (2002) (arguing that strong versions of the precautionary 
principle “have been systematically tamed”). 
139  I distinguish authorization from the classical formulation of the precautionary principle (a potential 
third way of understanding the precautionary approach), which provides that lack of scientific 
certainty should not preclude certain decisions. See, for example, Rio Declaration, supra note 21. I also 
consider European litigation regarding mad cow disease, sometimes cited for the proposition that 
precaution acted as authorization, see FOSTER, supra note 129, at 24 (“EU institutions are empowered 
to take protective measures . . . .”) (emphasis added), not entirely apposite, since precaution entered 
the equation with respect to the court’s proportionality calculation regarding the specific restrictions 
imposed, see Case C-180/96, United Kingdom v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 1998 E.C.R. I-
02265, ¶¶ 98–99, 103. 
140  Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.-Slovak.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, ¶ 37 (Sept. 25).  
141  Id. at ¶ 54 (discussing the “objective existence of a ‘peril’”) (emphasis added). 
142  Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 5.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter SPS Agreement]. 
143  E.C. Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Rep. of the Appellate Body, ¶ 
16, U.N. Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, (Jan. 16, 1998); see also id. at ¶ 29 (“‘Risk,’ for the purposes of the 
SPS Agreement, is the ‘potential’ for the harm or adverse effects . . . and, therefore, the mere 
possibility of risk arising suffices for the purposes of Articles 5.1 and 5.2.” (citing SPS Agreement, 
supra note 142)). But see id. at ¶ 43 (describing the U.S. view that precautionary principle “cannot 
create a risk assessment where there is none”). 
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interpretation . . . [and] the precautionary principle does not override the 
provisions of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement.”144 
Courts proved (at least somewhat) more sympathetic to claims that 
precaution required state action.145 For instance, in the New Zealand v. France146 case 
before the ICJ, while the court did not reopen its 1974 dismissal of New Zealand’s 
claim, in a much cited dissent Judge Weeramantry characterized the 
“precautionary principle” as a rule to help parties who lack sufficient information 
to show a threat nevertheless to litigate whether an opposing party, who might 
have greater access to information, has indeed done enough to avert the potential 
risk.147 The concept of precaution as obligation was also raised in a dispute 
between Ireland and the U.K. regarding potential radioactive discharge from a 
mixed oxide (MOX) nuclear reprocessing plant in the U.K.148 Ultimately, the 
Tribunal gave Ireland some measure of satisfaction by requiring that the U.K. and 
Ireland continue to exchange further information (although it did not necessarily 
rely on precaution to do so).149 Thus, to the extent one can detect trends in the 
interpretation of the precautionary approach during this period, they would favor 
reading it in the vein of risk as obligation, rather than risk as authorization. 
What was clear, however, was that precaution included procedural elements 
(and did not concern only substance). Thus, for instance, Jacqueline Peel has 
persuasively argued in favor of precaution as a process providing for the taking 
                                                 
144  Id. at ¶¶ 124–25; see also TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS, supra note 21, at 169 (“[T]he 
approach taken by the Appellate Body . . . appears to be somewhat inconsistent with its recognition 
that national governments may legitimately act in a cautious manner in the face of risk.”). 
145  Precaution as obligation is also evidenced for instance by the Fish Stocks Agreement, The U.N. 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks art. 6(3)(b), 2167 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 
11, 2001); id. at Annex II(2); see also 1996 Protocol to the London Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other Matters arts. 3(1), 4(1), 36 I.L.M. 1 (entered into 
force Mar. 24, 2006).  
146  N.Z. v. Fr., 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 288. 
147  Id. at 342 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). I do not find the argument that the precautionary approach 
entails a reversal of the burden of proof persuasive.  
148  Compare MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Request for Provisional Measures and Statement of 
Case of Ireland of Nov. 9, 2011, ¶ 101, 4 ITLOS Pleadings 5, with MOX Plant, (Ir. v. U.K.), Case 
No. 10, Written Response of the United Kingdom of Nov. 15, 2011, ¶ 134, 4 ITLOS Pleadings 
361. Cf. MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Order of Dec. 3, 2001, ¶ 71, 5 ITLOS Rep. 95 
(“Considering that Ireland argues that the precautionary principle places the burden on the United 
Kingdom to demonstrate that no harm would arise from discharges and other consequences of the 
operation of the MOX plant.”). 
149  MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Order of Dec. 3, 2001, ¶ 89, 5 ITLOS Rep. 95, 107–08. Likewise, in the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, the ITLOS applied provisional measures after hearing arguments 
that precaution served as obligation. See Southern Bluefin Tuna (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 
Case Nos. 3 & 4, Order of August 27, 1999, ¶¶ 80, 85, 3 ITLOS Rep. 280, 293–94. 
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into account “of scientific uncertainty in decision-making.”150 Indeed, a number 
of the litigated cases ultimately resulted in orders to exchange information (this 
was true of the MOX plant case as well as an ITLOS dispute between Singapore 
and Malaysia regarding a Singaporean land reclamation project.151). The 
precautionary approach also operated both in contextual and categorical terms.152 
Finally, states also appeared to become increasingly skeptical of risk as 
authorization for the use of force, at least with respect to the defense of nationals. 
The theory of defense of nationals dates to the pre-U.N. Charter era153 and its 
legal underpinnings appear not to have been much considered at the time.154 But 
in the post-Charter period, there began to be robust debates about when the risk 
to one’s nationals might justify the use of force on the territory of another state. 
While the U.S. invoked defense of nationals to justify (at least in part) the use of 
force in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama,155 and while John Dugard 
sought to include in the ILC’s draft articles on diplomatic protection a reference 
to the possibility of using force under limited circumstances to defend nationals,156 
states were leery.157 
                                                 
150  Peel, supra note 21, at 497. 
151  Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), Case No. 12, Order of Oct. 
8, 2003, ¶ 106, 7 ITLOS Rep. 10, 47. 
152  Consider, for instance, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, which 
provides for listing of chemicals and stipulates that lack of scientific certainty shall not prevent a 
listing proposal from proceeding. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants art. 
8(7)(a), 2256 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force May 22, 2001).  
153  See Security Council Official Records, 1939th Mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.1939, ¶ 106 (July 9, 1976) 
(citing Judge Huber’s decision in Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims (Gr. Brit. v. Spain), 2 R.I.A.A. 
615 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1925)). 
154  Andrew W.R. Thomson, Doctrine of the Protection of National Abroad: Rise of the Non-Combatant 
Evacuation Operation, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 627, 630 (2012). 
155  Tom Ruys, The ‘Protection of Nationals’ Doctrine Revisited, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 233, 244–45 (2008); 
see Adlai Stevenson, Letter Dated Apr. 29, 1965 from the Permanent Representative of the United 
States of America Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/6310 (Apr. 29, 
1965) (“American lives were in danger.”); U.N. SCOR, 2491st mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2491 
(Oct. 27, 1983) (“Those circumstances included danger to innocent United States nationals, the 
absence of a minimally responsible Government in Grenada and the danger posed to the OECS by 
the relatively awesome military might that those responsible for the murder of the Bishop 
Government how had their disposal.”); id. at 8 (“[I]t was fully reasonable for the United States to 
conclude that these madmen might decide at any moment to hold hostage the 1,000 American 
citizens on that island.”); U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2899th mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2899 (Dec. 
20, 1989) (“designed to protect American lives”); id. at 32 (quoting President George H.W. Bush 
that Noriega had “created an imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in Panama”). 
156  John R. Dugard (Special Rapporteur on Diplomatic Protection), First Rep. on Diplomatic Protection, 
218, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/506 (Apr. 7, 2000). 
157  See Ruys, supra note 155, at 267. 
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This then was the state of play at the end of the twentieth century—a 
marrying of due diligence and prevention, which led to the rise of risk as obligation 
as opposed to authorization, coupled with the ability to see it both as procedural 
or substantive, something to be considered by category or on a case-by-case basis, 
and an expanding, but as yet limited, scope. The last fifteen or so years, however, 
have seen the use of risk truly flower, with risk analysis deployed across a wide 
variety of fields and in myriad ways. It is to this I turn in the next Section. 
IV.  THE RISE OF RISK  
In this Section, I describe the role of risk in international law (and soft-law 
commitments) since 2001.158 That role has increased dramatically, not only in that 
risk is now used in many ways, but also with respect to risk’s scope of application. 
In the first Section below, I show how risk has become relevant to new actors, 
new harms, and new areas of law. In the Section that follows, I describe how risk 
is now the subject of increasingly sophisticated analysis. 
A.  New Actor,  New Harm 
In this Section, I assess in turn two expansions of the role of risk in 
international law—the first concerning who should undertake risk analysis and the 
second regarding new types of harm and areas of law to which risk has become 
legally relevant. Prior to the recent developments I describe here, risk was 
something states were expected to assess, even where it was the conduct of non-
state actors that gave rise to the risk of harm and “harm” was (in the context of 
environmental law, which was the principal area of law where risk played a role) 
physical, transboundary harm to (the territory of) another state.159 But as Rebecca 
Bratspies and Russell Miller note in the introduction to their useful volume on the 
Trail Smelter case, “[r]edefining ‘harm’ also means confronting new actors and new 
victims.”160 Thus, for instance, as John Ruggie has said of corporate human rights 
due diligence, which I discuss in greater detail below, “[human rights impact 
assessments] should deviate from the [environmental impact assessments] 
approach of examining a project’s direct impacts, and instead force consideration 
                                                 
158  I choose this year somewhat arbitrarily but it was when the ILC completed its Draft Articles on 
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, see supra note 118. 
159  Compare with the sources listed in note 111, supra, which speak to the earlier “dyadic” approach to 
harm. There, harm was something that occurred to a single other or identified set of states, as 
opposed to something that could be claimed by any state. 
160  Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller, Introduction to TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 101, at 1, 8. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 628 Vol. 18 No. 2 
of how the project could possibly interact with each and every right.”161 In the 
next two sub-sections, I describe how such an expansion has occurred—covering 
new actors, new acts, and new victims. 
1. New Actors 
The first expansion concerns who should undertake risk analysis. 
Increasingly, there is an international normative expectation that non-state actors 
will also do so. This is evidenced by the widespread uptake of the U.N. Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (GPs),162 which are a non-binding set 
of guidelines for states and businesses endorsed by the U.N. Human Rights 
Council and constructed around a “protect, respect, and remedy” framework.163 
Under the U.N. GPs, businesses are expected to “respect” human rights. 
Specifically, Guiding Principle 15 asserts that businesses should have a “human 
rights due diligence process to identify prevent, mitigate and account for how they 
address their impacts on human rights,”164 and Guiding Principle 17 recommends 
that businesses evaluate both actual and “potential human rights impacts.”165 I 
discuss the substance of human rights due diligence by businesses in greater detail 
below but suffice it to say that an international expectation that non-state actors 
themselves undertake risk assessments and seek to prevent harm reflects a 
dramatic expansion in the role of risk at the international level. 
The flip side is that states are also increasingly expected to assess the risk 
posed by the conduct of a variety of other actors, beyond just private actors on 
their territory whose conduct may have transboundary effects (that is, the question 
of ‘risk by whom posed’ now has a more expansive set of answers). First, states are 
supposed to evaluate the risk that other states, or armed groups with which they 
may engage extraterritorially, may present. For instance, in the Genocide 
Convention166 case, the ICJ held that Serbia had a due diligence obligation with 
regard to the risk of genocide being perpetrated by Bosnian Serb forces, which 
                                                 
161  Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Human Rights Impact Assessments—
Resolving Key Methodological Questions, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/74 (Feb. 5, 2007). 
162  Guiding Principles, supra note 22. 
163  See John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, § I, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
164  Guiding Principles, supra note 22, at 15–16. 
165  Id. at 18–19. 
166  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 183 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Genocide 
Convention case]. 
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Serbia was then supporting.167 Perhaps even more broadly, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has recently168 adopted a new interpretation 
of Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions to the effect that states have an 
obligation to “do everything reasonably in their power” to ensure respect for IHL 
by third parties169 on the basis of risk analysis.170 
A similar due diligence principle is also increasingly applied to the risks posed 
by non-state actors operating around the world where they may have a territorial 
link to the state but their conduct occurs principally extraterritorially, such as with 
respect to terrorists, or where their link may be contractual rather than territorial, 
such as with respect to private security contractors.171 Thus, for instance, there has 
been considerable debate about whether to consider self-defense against non-state 
actors under the rubric of attribution (in other words, a state may invoke self-
defense to respond to an attack by a non-state actor under circumstances where 
that attack is attributable to the territorial state, which would require a greater 
                                                 
167  The court stated that this obligation “arise[s] at the instant that the State learns of, or should 
normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.” Id. at ¶ 
431 (emphasis added). 
168  This is a change from earlier iterations of the commentary. See, for example, Carlo Focarelli, Common 
Article 1of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 125, 134 (2010); Oona A. 
Hathaway et al., supra note 98, at 28 (“These revised commentaries adopt a broader vision.”). It has 
occasioned considerable debate. Cf. Oona Hathaway & Zachary Manfredi, The State Department 
Adviser Signals a Middle Road on Common Article 1, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 12, 2016) 
https://perma.cc/HU42-ZYGK. 
169  See ICRC REVISED COMMENTARY, supra note 24, at 118; see also id. at 150.  
170  See Knut Dormann & Jose Serralvo, Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the Obligation to 
Prevent International Humanitarian Law Violations, 96 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 707, 729–30 
(2014) (discussing action “where the risk of such violations can be reasonably foreseen”). 
Previously, in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 104 ¶ 220 
(June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua], the ICJ had focused on a negative obligation not to assist in IHL 
violations. See id. (stating that the U.S. was “under an obligation not to encourage persons or groups 
engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in violation of [IHL]”) (emphasis added). By the time of 
the Wall advisory opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 200 (July 9), the ICJ was speaking of 
a (not defined) positive prevention obligation (it said—quite opaquely—that “all the States parties 
to the [Geneva Conventions] are under an obligation . . . to ensure compliance by Israel with 
international humanitarian law”). Id. at 200, ¶ 159. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 200 ¶ 159 (July 
9). But even that is not equivalent to an obligation to act where there is a risk of unlawful conduct.  
171  I do not engage here the question of the extraterritorial scope of human rights obligations. Compare 
Oona A. Hathaway et al., Human Rights Abroad: When Do Human Rights Treaty Obligations Apply 
Extraterritorially?, 43 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 389, 390 (2011), with DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (CarrieLyn D. Guymon ed., 2014) (“The United States continues to 
believe that its interpretation—that the Covenant applies only to individuals that are both within 
the territory of a State Party and within its jurisdiction—is the most consistent with the Covenant’s 
language and negotiating history.”) (emphasis in original). 
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quantum of control by the state over the non-state actor) or under a due-diligence-
like rubric (that is, a state may invoke self-defense to respond to an attack by a 
non-state actor where the territorial state is unable or unwilling to address the 
threat).172 The latter is increasingly the dominant paradigm,173 and turns on risk 
(both with respect to expectations of conduct by the territorial state174 and the 
question of when a state threatened by a non-state actor may exercise its right of 
self-defense). Likewise, the Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal 
Obligations and Good Practices for State Related to Operations of Private 
Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict provides that states have 
an obligation to “take appropriate measures to prevent[ ] any violations of 
international humanitarian law by personnel of [private military and security 
companies].”175 
With respect to this broader range of actors, risk is relevant both as 
obligation and as authorization. For instance, due diligence with respect to the 
conduct of an armed group on a state’s territory involves both risk as obligation 
and risk as authorization (insofar as if the state is unwilling or unable to suppress 
a threat, it may give rise to a right of self-defense on the part of another state on 
that state’s territory176). Risks posed by these various actors may also give rise to 
both procedural and substantive obligations. Thus, for instance, the Arms Trade 
Treaty requires risk assessments (procedural) and prohibits transfers (substantive) 
                                                 
172  Risk is also increasingly relevant to questions of jus in bello. Thus, for instance, while risk (in the 
sense of threat) has long been relevant under the Fourth Geneva Convention to interment 
decisions, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 
42(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, risk was also made relevant—whether as a 
legal matter or as a policy matter—to detention of belligerents during the Obama Administration. 
Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantánamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Exec. Order No. 13,567, § 2, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 
2011). 
173  See Elena Chachko & Ashley Deeks, Who is on Board with “Unwilling or Unable”?, LAWFARE (Oct. 10, 
2016), https://perma.cc/RG33-D4GZ. But see Kevin Jon Heller, The Absence of Practice Supporting the 
“Unwilling or Unable” Test, OPINIO JURIS (Feb. 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/TNQ7-LZ7D. 
174  See, for example, Vincent-Joel Proulx, Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be Strictly Liable for Failing to 
Prevent Transborder Attacks, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 615, 652–53 (2005) (discussing strict liability 
with a due diligence defense). 
175  INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE MONTREUX DOCUMENT ON PERTINENT 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND GOOD PRACTICES FOR STATE RELATED TO 
OPERATIONS OF PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES DURING ARMED CONFLICT 11, ¶ 3 
(2009) https://perma.cc/ZNK2-L9ZP [hereinafter MONTREUX DOCUMENT].  
176  The “unwilling or unable” test speaks to the question of whether the use of force is lawful on the 
territory of a particular state. The antecedent question of whether force may lawfully be used against a 
particular armed group turns on (among other factors) whether that armed group has attacked the 
state wishing to use force (or whether there is an imminent threat of such an attack). 
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under certain circumstances.177 And finally, risk may be assessed contextually or 
categorically. Consider the question of whether certain activities of private security 
contractors are inherently risky178 or whether certain business conduct should be 
likewise so considered (such as transactions involving minerals from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo).179 
2. New Harm 
The second expansion is that a risk-based approach is also increasingly being 
applied to non-physical, territorially-diffuse harms. For instance, a large number 
of commentators have begun suggesting that due diligence norms be applied to 
cyberspace.180 While in some cases, cyber activity could produce physical effects 
that would bring cyber within the realm of what the ILC historically focused 
upon,181 in many cases cyber activities would not have such effects.182 Moreover, 
cyber activities also pose challenging questions of geography insofar as their 
effects may not be transboundary (meaning crossing a border shared by two 
states) (and cyber activities may transit the territory of uninvolved states).183 
This concept of due diligence with respect to cyber activities is increasingly 
risk-oriented. The Cybercrime Convention reflects a traditional approach to 
deterring the use of a state’s territory for malicious activities (harkening back to 
the earlier concept of due diligence)—that is, a requirement to criminalize.184 But 
                                                 
177  See Arms Trade Treaty, G.A. Res. 67/234 B arts. 7(1)(b)(i), 7(3), Apr. 2, 2013, 
https://perma.cc/48KT-H4XV. The Arms Trade Treaty explicitly goes beyond the doctrine of 
state responsibility. Alexandra Boivin, Complicity and Beyond: International Law and the Transfer of Small 
Arms and Light Weapons, 87 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 467, 469, 493 (2005). 
178  MONTREUX DOCUMENT, supra note 175, at 11, ¶ 2 (suggesting that states when contracting should 
“tak[e] into account the inherent risk associated with the services to be performed”). 
179  See, for example, S.C. Res. 1857, ¶ 15 (Dec. 22, 2008); see also Final Rep. of the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ¶¶ 306, 308, U.N. Doc. S/2010/596 (Nov. 29, 2010) (discussing “red 
flag” locations). Cf. OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF 
MINERALS FROM CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH RISK AREAS, ANNEX I 18 (2d ed. 2013) 
(discussing specific-mineral-based risk analyses). 
180  See generally note 23, supra, collecting sources. 
181  Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, supra note 23, at 75. 
182  Walton, supra note 23, at 1472–73. 
183 Scott J. Shackelford et al., Unpacking the International Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the 
Public and Private Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 22 (2016) (distinguishing Trail Smelter as it involved a 
“geographical constraint”). 
184  Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Response to Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active 
Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 64 (2009) (“[It] 
demonstrates state recognition of both the need to criminalize cyberattacks, and the duty of states 
to prevent their territory from being used by non-state actors to conduct cyberattacks against other 
states.”). 
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an obligation to prosecute—standing alone—may be insufficient.185 Thus, 
scholars are increasingly focused on strictly preventative measures, such as risk-
evaluation procedures186 and notice and consultation provisions.187 And, Beatrice 
Walton has proposed to import the ILC’s concept of liability for transboundary 
harm to the world of low-intensity cyber conduct.188 
Nor is the debate confined to cyber activities. Some, for instance, have 
sought to apply due diligence norms to the development and potential deployment 
of autonomous weapons systems, seeking to analogize to the due diligence 
standard applicable to ultra-hazardous environmental activities.189 
B.  Enhanced Obligations and Particularized Risk  
In this Section, I make the case that risk has not just propagated to other 
actors and other topics, but it is increasingly reticulated. That is, obligations that 
were uncertain (and in particular procedural obligations) have been firmed up; and 
areas of law that had a risk element have begun to require more detailed risk 
analyses. 
1. Deeper Acceptance of Risk 
The first development has been the clarification of uncertain risk-based 
obligations. While in 2003, Xue Hanqin stated that “it is questionable whether [a 
duty to undertake environmental impact assessments] can be claimed on the basis 
of customary international law,”190 matters have advanced considerably since 
                                                 
185  Id. at 9 (“[D]espite Chinese and Russian pledges to crackdown on their attackers, no one has been 
brought to justice for any of the attacks discussed.”). 
186  Ziolkowski, supra note 23, at 169; Ortner, supra note 23, at 208 (“[T]he government should 
independently seek to measure and evaluate its progress by conducting impact assessments.”); see 
also Benedikt Pirker, Territorial Sovereignty and Integrity and the Challenges of Cyberspace, in PEACETIME 
REGIME, supra note 23, at 189, 208 (asserting that there “may be a certain minimum standard of 
control over cyber activities that needs to be respected”). But see TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 23, 
at 44–45; Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, supra note 23 (“[T]here was no agreement 
as to whether the due diligence obligation applies when a state knows that such activities will be 
launched but they have not yet materialized.”). For an interesting recent development, see Kristen 
Eichensehr, Would the United States be Responsible for Private Hacking, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/QZD8-HR2B (discussing voluntary review by the U.S. government of proposed 
cyber actions and the consequences thereof). 
187  Jason Healey & Hannah Pitts, Applying International Environmental Legal Norms to Cyber Statecraft, 8 
I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 356, 376 (2012). 
188  Walton, supra note 23, at 1465 (suggesting “applying this liability approach to low-intensity state-
sponsored cyber attack”). 
189  Nehal Bhuta & Stavros-Evdokimos Pantazopoulous, Autonomy and Uncertainty: Increasingly 
Autonomous Weapons Systems and the International Legal Regulation of Risk, in AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 
SYSTEMS: LAW, ETHICS, POLICY at 284, 291 (Nehal Bhuta et al. eds., 2016). 
190  HANQIN, supra note 111, at 167. 
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then.191 Indeed, in two recent decisions of the ICJ and a decision of the Seabed 
Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS, tribunals have asserted such an obligation.192 
Not only have the ICJ and ITLOS suggested that environmental impact 
assessments should be seen as on a sturdier footing,193 they have also given some 
guidance regarding when in their view such assessments are required, beginning 
the work of identifying the level of risk that necessitates more careful scrutiny,194 
which has further contributed to the firming up of what the ICJ has said is an 
obligation.195 In Certain Activities and Construction of a Road, the court examined “the 
nature and magnitude of the project and the context in which it was to be carried 
out” and concluded that there was a sufficient risk that Costa Rica should have 
carried out an environmental impact assessment.196 Litigation between Malaysia 
and Singapore before ITLOS also yielded useful practice on bilateral 
environmental factfinding,197 especially as prompted by an ITLOS provisional 
measures order.198 Finally, the South China Sea arbitral award glossed Article 206 
of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in evaluating whether China had 
                                                 
191  Moreover, instruments requiring or purporting to require EIAs continue to proliferate. The 2008 
Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, like the Watercourses Convention, provides 
that states shall share “available technical data and information, including any environmental impact 
assessment,” where “planned activities . . . may affect a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system 
and thereby may have a significant adverse effect upon another State.” Draft Articles on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers, with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/63/10, at 65 (2008). 
192  See supra note 17. The ICJ has been somewhat unclear whether in its view the requirement of an 
EIA derives from states’ due diligence obligations or is free-standing. Compare Nicar. v. Costa Rica, 
2015 I.C.J. Rep. 665, ¶¶ 18–22 (separate opinion of Owada, J.), and Nicar. v. Costa Rica, 2015 I.C.J. 
Rep. 665, ¶ 9 (separate opinion of Donoghue, J.), with Nicar. v. Costa Rica, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 665, ¶ 
9 (separate opinion of Dugard, J.). The Seabed Disputes Chamber has been much clearer. 
Responsibilities and Obligations of States, Advisory Opinion, supra, ¶ 145 (“It should be stressed 
that the obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment is a . . . general obligation under 
customary international law.”). 
193  I take no position on the substantive question of whether environmental impact assessments are 
required by customary or general international law, and, if so, why. My point here is descriptive. 
194  Under corollary U.S. law, the first question an agency must address is whether the risk of affecting 
the environment is sufficient to require an environmental impact statement in the first place (if not, 
the federal agency issues a finding of no significant impact). See, for example, Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Transp., 753 F.2d 120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
195  This kind of guidance is significant in light of the differences John Knox has identified at the 
domestic level regarding how states undertake EIAs. John H. Knox, Assessing the Candidates for a 
Global Treaty on Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 153, 156–57 
(2003). 
196  Nicar. v. Costa Rica, supra note 17, at 720–21, ¶ 155. Cf. id. at 707, ¶ 105 (concluding that Nicaragua 
was not required to carry out an EIA). 
197  FOSTER, supra note 129, at 36 (describing the case as representing “a high-water mark in the co-
operative settlement of international disputes involving scientific uncertainty”). 
198  Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor, supra note 151, at ¶ 106. 
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in fact carried out an EIA.199 One commentator has argued that the Panel’s 
emphasis on the importance of a “comprehensive” assessment provides 
important guidance.200 
2. Risk Specificity 
The second development has been that even where risk had previously been 
relevant, the expectation is now that a harder look will be taken at particular risks, 
in both categorical and contextual analyses.201 This can most clearly be seen in the 
context of human rights due diligence, both by states and by corporations. 
Human rights due diligence has principally developed through instruments 
and international case law regarding violence against women.202 Early on, the focus 
was on having the appropriate laws203 and on the need to investigate potential 
abuses.204 This paralleled the way due diligence was conceived with respect to the 
                                                 
199  The South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award of Jul. 12, 2016, 
¶ 989 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016). 
200  Makane Moise Mbengue, The South China Sea Arbitration: Innovations in Marine Environmental Fact-
Finding and Due Diligence Obligations, 110 A.J.I.L. UNBOUND 285, 286–87 (2016). 
201  By this I mean that specific risks are identified, which could be presented either by a category of 
activities or a specific act. 
202  Most trace these developments to the decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 
1988), although a case involving disappearances not domestic violence, in which the court held that 
“[t]he State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use 
the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its 
jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the 
victim adequate compensation.” Id. at ¶ 174. For the relationship between subsequent jurisprudence 
on domestic violence and this case, see, for example, Patricia Tarre Moser, The Duty to Ensure Human 
Rights and Its Evolution in the Inter-American System: Comparing Maria Da Penha v. Brazil with Lenahan 
(Gonzales) v. United States, 21 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 437 (2012). The Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (the CEDAW Committee) also relied on this 
logic in adopting its General Recommendation 19. Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, 
supra note 35, at ¶ 24(a). The U.S. has expressed some skepticism regarding the scope of due 
diligence obligations, see Lenahan v. United States, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 80/11 ¶ 3 (Aug. 17, 2011) (“The State moreover claims that the petitioners cite no provision 
of the American Declaration that imposes on the United States an affirmative duty, such as the 
exercise of due diligence.”), and I take no position on the merits of their view as my argument here 
is descriptive. 
203  Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra note 202, at ¶ 175 (“This duty to prevent includes all those 
means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of human 
rights and ensure that any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts.”). For instance, the 
CEDAW Committee specifically recommended certain forms of legislation, such as making 
available the equivalent of restraining orders. General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 35, at 
¶ 24(t)(ii). 
204  Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, supra note 202, at ¶ 176 (“The State is obligated to investigate every 
situation involving a violation of the rights protected by the Convention.”); Declaration on the 
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protection of foreign nationals. As the then-Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women said, “the application of the due diligence standard, to date, has 
. . . [been] limited to responding to violence when it occurs, largely neglecting the 
obligation to prevent . . . .”205 Likewise, one commentator contrasted the Inter-
American Commission’s recent casework with earlier cases, saying that the latter 
“only explored how the lack of an official investigation violated the victim’s right 
to judicial remedy and to a fair trial . . . [and not] the State’s obligation to prevent 
the severe domestic violence.”206 
More recently, however, the focus has truly turned to preventing risk, including 
by analyzing risk more closely. Thus, a 2005 Council of Europe recommendation 
requested states to “ensure that measures are taken to protect victims effectively 
against threats and possible acts of revenge.”207 The recommendation went beyond 
earlier recommendations regarding legislation and gave specificity to calls for the 
availability of restraining orders, suggesting “enabl[ing] the judiciary to 
adopt . . . interim measures aimed at protecting the victims, the banning of a 
perpetrator from contacting, communicating with or approaching the victim, 
residing in or entering defined areas.”208 Most recently, the Council of Europe 
adopted a convention on violence against women and domestic violence that 
includes specific preventive obligations,209 predicated upon risk assessments.210 
Likewise, the European Court of Human Rights has recently begun to take this 
                                                 
Elimination of Violence against Women art. 4(c), U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993) 
(“[P]revent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against 
women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons.”); Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, supra 
note 35, at art. 7(b) (“[A]pply due diligence to prevent, investigate and impose penalties for violence 
against women”). Thus in the Maria da Pehna Maia Fernandes case, Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes 
v. Brazil, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 54/01, (Apr. 16, 2001), before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, the question was whether the state was responsible for 
having condoned domestic violence under circumstances where “for more than 15 years, it has 
failed to take the effective measures required to prosecute and punish the aggressor, despite 
repeated complaints.” Id. at ¶ 2; see also id. at ¶ 44 (“The Commission holds the view that the 
domestic judicial decisions in this case reveal inefficiency, negligence, and failure to act on the part 
of the Brazilian judicial authorities and unjustified delay in the prosecution of the accused.”). 
205  Yakin Ertürk (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women), The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool 
for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006).  
206  Moser, supra note 202, at 438. 
207  Eur. Consult. Ass’n, Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States 
on the Protection of Women Against Violence app. ¶ 44, 794th Sess. (Apr. 30, 2002) (emphasis 
added). 
208  Id. at ¶ 58(b). 
209  Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and 
Domestic Violence art. 5(2), Apr. 7, 2011, C.E.T.S. No. 210. 
210  Id. at art. 51(1). This is an emerging field at the domestic level. See generally, for example, Jacquelyn C. 
Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide, 250 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 14 (2003). 
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approach211 in, for instance, Opuz v. Turkey.212 While Opuz applied an attribution 
test turning on knowledge, as Cheryl Hanna has put it, “Opuz provides a useful 
starting point for framing the affirmative duty to undertake a risk assessment in 
all cases made known to state authorities.”213 Courts and other bodies have also 
focused recently on the specifics of laws regarding restraining orders,214 which in 
effect reflect judicial judgments regarding risk.215 As one commentator has put it, 
the “evolution in case law . . . [has been moving toward] the theory of foreseeable 
risk.”216 
With respect to corporate human rights due diligence, while the concept is 
new, and therefore this is not an evolution, the expectation has been similar: that 
corporations will look at very particular risks. The concept of corporate human 
rights due diligence has been shaped by analogous domestic law,217 which is 
                                                 
211  For very useful surveys of this jurisprudence, see generally Lee Hassselbacher, State Obligations 
Regarding Domestic Violence: The European Court of Human Rights, Due Diligence, and International Legal 
Minimums of Protection, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 190 (2009) and Benedetta Faedi Duramy, Judicial 
Developments in the Application of International Law to Domestic Violence, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 413 (2012). 
212  Opuz v. Turkey, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 144.  
213  Cheryl Hanna, Health, Human Rights, and Violence Against Women and Girls: Broadly Redefining Affirmative 
State Duties after Opuz v. Turkey, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 145 (2011). 
214  In Bevacqua v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 71127/01, ¶ 83 (2008), for instance, the European 
Court suggested that the preventive measures set forth in the Council of Europe’s recommendation 
might be required. (“[T]he Court considers that certain administrative and policing measures—
among them, for example, those mentioned in Recommendation Rec(2002)5 . . . would have been 
called for.”). And in A.T. v. Hungary, CEDAW Comm., No. 2/2003, ¶ 2.1, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/32/D/2/2003 (2005), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women considered an allegation that Hungary had inadequate preventive measures because there 
were “no protection orders or restraining orders available under Hungarian law.”  
215  Lenahan v. United States, supra note 202, at ¶ 145 (noting “judicial recognition of risk”). 
216  Moser, supra note 202, at 439; see also Rashida Manjoo (Special Rapporteur on Violence Against 
Women), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, ¶¶ 70–71, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/49 (May 4, 2013) (suggesting that it might be useful to distinguish 
“systemic” due diligence from “individual” due diligence). This way of approaching due diligence 
stands in some contrast to the earlier jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which 
tended not to look deeply into how domestic authorities considered risk on the front end; see Osman 
v. U.K., Judgment, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 116 (Oct. 28, 1998) (explaining that the “obligation must [not] 
be interpreted in a way which . . . impose[s] an impossible or disproportionate burden on the 
authorities.”). 
217  See, for example, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of 
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect 
and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights ¶ 56, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 
2008) (“Comparable processes are typically already embedded in companies because in many 
countries they are legally required to have information and control systems in place to assess and 
manage financial and related risks.”); Mark B. Taylor et al., Due Diligence for Human Rights: A Risk 
Based Approach at 2 (Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 53, 2009), 
https://perma.cc/ZT6W-YZEP; Olga Martin-Ortega, Human Rights Due Diligence for Corporations: 
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decidedly specific. 218 And, this concept of specific due diligence has been 
replicated at the international level.219 Indeed, one prominent report seeking to 
gloss due diligence under the U.N. Guiding Principles has specifically argued that 
“an investigative process must be undertaken for the purpose of preventing 
harm,”220 including such specific measures as field visits under certain 
circumstances.221 The same has been true of recent OECD work on the subject.222 
V.  REASONS FOR RISK ’S RISE AND CONSEQUENCES THEREOF  
A.  Why Risk? 
In this Section, I seek to offer potential reasons for the trend I have sought 
to identify. I offer six such potential reasons. First, as I have sought to show, risk-
based obligations may be (and often are) procedural (e.g., a requirement to 
undertake an environmental impact assessment); if substantive, the obligation is 
                                                 
From Voluntary Standards to Hard Law at Last?, 32 NETH. Q. OF HUM. RTS. 44, 51 (2014) (“[Ruggie] 
translated the due diligence that companies were accustomed to performing in commercial relations 
and transactions into the sphere of human rights.”); Robert McCorquodale, Social Responsibility and 
International Human Rights Law, 87 J. BUS. OF ETHICS 385, 392 (2009) (“This concept of due diligence 
appears to be an integration of the human rights obligation . . . and the general business practice of 
due diligence.”); ILA Study Group, First Report, supra note 29, at 20 (“This appears to be an integration 
of the international human rights legal obligation of due diligence . . . and the general voluntary 
business practice of due diligence.”). 
218  Take due diligence in the context of the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA). The Department of 
Justice and Securities Exchange Commission have indicated they will consider the existence and 
extent of compliance programs in deciding what cases to pursue. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
AND SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 56 (Nov. 14, 2012), https://perma.cc/7SJG-QXTR [hereinafter FCPA RESOURCE 
GUIDE] (“DOJ and SEC also consider the adequacy of a company’s compliance program when 
deciding what, if any, action to take.”). Compliance programs are risk based. FCPA RESOURCE 
GUIDE, supra, at 58 (“Assessment of risk is fundamental to developing a strong compliance 
program”). Indeed, under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, an effective compliance program is 
defined as one where the corporation “exercise[s] due diligence to prevent and detect criminal 
conduct.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES Chapter 8 § 8B2.1(a)(1). Specifically, for a program to be 
deemed effective “the organization [is expected] periodically [to] assess the risk of criminal 
conduct.” Id. at § 8B2.1(c). And DOJ and SEC assert that “each compliance program should be 
tailored to an organization’s specific needs, risks, and challenges.” FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra, 
at 57. 
219  Martin-Ortega, supra note 217, at 56–57 (stating that it includes “the flexibility of the concept 
according to size and activity”). 
220  Taylor et al., supra note 217, at 2. 
221  Id. at 11–12. 
222  See, for example, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Recommendation of the 
Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Annex 
II, § A(6) (Nov. 26, 2009); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises, at 47 (2011).  
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usually one of conduct and not of result (e.g., due diligence). These kinds of 
obligations are attractive because they permit meaningful legal development 
without being overly prescriptive. Consider for instance the Security Council 
resolutions on the DPRK. A requirement to prohibit transactions that are likely 
to benefit the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs is a useful 
compromise between states with different perspectives: Those states that wish to 
further constrain the DPRK are able to make incremental progress (insofar as 
such a provision provides a hook to lobby other states regarding pending 
transactions with a view to getting them to prohibit them and, in some cases, may 
provide a domestic legal basis for those states to act); at the same time, such a 
provision leaves a margin of discretion for states that may be less willing to take 
significant steps (to the extent those states are prepared to argue that risky 
transactions are not sufficiently likely to benefit the DPRK’s prohibited programs 
as to come within the ambit of the resolution). Likewise, where risk plays a role in 
authorization, it tends to be self-judging, which is appealing to states, especially in 
the national security space. 
Lest this appear too cynical an account, risk can also permit states to 
“legalize” desirable caution (along the lines of the precautionary approach, but 
also more broadly). Take, for example, recent developments with respect to 
proportionality and precautions in the conduct of hostilities. Scholars have 
increasingly asserted the importance of robust assessments of the risk of civilian 
casualties223 and the Obama administration issued presidential policy guidance 
(what one commentator has called “folk law”224), which required that “direct 
action will be taken only if there is near certainty that the action can be taken 
without injuring or killing non-combatants.”225 Moreover, whatever one thinks of 
precaution, it is undoubtedly true that traditional treaty-making may be an 
imperfect fit for situations where our collective understanding of the problem is 
                                                 
223  Geoffrey Corn, War, Law, and Oft Overlooked Value of Process as a Precautionary Measure, 42 PEPP. L. 
REV. 419, 455 (2015) (“[T]he scope of intelligence collection and analysis must be understood to 
include a continuing obligation to assess civilian considerations of the military operation in order 
to facilitate the commander’s assessment of civilian risk associated with targeting decisions.”); 
Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681, 745 (2014) (“Perhaps the 
simplest way to understand the mitigation process is to think of it as a series of tests based on 
risk.”). That precautions in attack involves risk assessment is not of course new, see, for example, 
MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE 
TWO 1997 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 363 (1982), but it 
has gained increased salience. 
224  See generally Naz K. Modirzadeh, Folk International Law: 9/11 Lawyering and the Transformation of the 
Law of Armed Conflict to Human Rights Policy and Human Rights Law to War Governance, 5 HARV. NAT’L 
SEC. J. 225 (2014). 
225  See Procedures for Approving Direct Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United States and 
Areas of Active Hostilities (May 22, 2013), https://perma.cc/N53N-NWJH. 
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subject to rapid change.226 Thus, risk assessment, which is a static principle with 
dynamic output based on probabilities, may be useful. The bottom line is that risk 
can be very helpful to policymaking insofar as it can facilitate solving a variety of 
problems that require carefully calibrated responses. 
A second potential reason for the rise of risk may be related to a broader 
shift toward ex ante compliance rather than ex post reparation (a shift described in 
part above as well). As Dinah Shelton has pointed out, “[b]reach[es] [today are] 
unlikely to injure another state directly or give rise to a classic claim for 
reparations.”227 Part and parcel with this change in the nature of disputes, as she 
argues, is that we tend increasingly to see ex ante compliance mechanisms.228 Risk 
fits neatly within that paradigm, both because risk (assessed ex ante) helps to 
identify situations where non-compliance may occur (before it does) and because 
it can be harnessed to the broader array of modes of compliance that different 
bodies are now pioneering (as opposed to more traditional inter-state litigation 
after the fact). More broadly, at the domestic level, the increasing use of risk 
assessments has characterized the rise of modern administration, and there is a 
colorable argument that states are increasingly acting as regulators at the 
international level (whether through international organizations229 or simply by 
virtue of the extraterritorial effects that their decisions may have). On this account, 
risk analysis is increasing because of the kinds of decisions states are now taking, 
which may also lend themselves to risk analysis.230 
Third, a risk-based approach accounts for the multiplicity of actors relevant 
to international decision-making, both actors potentially involved in causing harm 
and actors who may be victims of harm. Risk-based norms, of course, better 
account for the potential harms caused by non-state actors than do state-
attribution rules; risk also has a flexible aperture and is readily susceptible to being 
widened to capture as many or as few as may be desired with respect to the 
                                                 
226  FOSTER, supra note 129, at 9 (discussing the “difficulty with keeping international standards up to 
date with scientific developments”); David A. Wirth, Examining Decision-Making Processes in 
International Environmental law, 79 IOWA L. REV. 769, 792 (1994) (“Unfortunately, the fit between the 
law and many environmental problems is poor [because] [s]cientific knowledge . . . can change 
rapidly.”).  
227  Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 833, 
834 (2002). 
228  Id. at 854–55.  
229  Cf. Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE 
L.J. 1490, 1494 (2006) (analogizing views of international organization policy-making to “suspicions 
that accompanied the founding of the American administrative state”). 
230  See, for example, Proulx, supra note 174, at 644 (“The global effort against terrorism is an exercise in 
risk assessment.”). 
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question of whose exposure to risk is relevant.231 In a world where 
“interdependence . . . has become painfully evident,”232 risk may play a useful role 
in calibrating the scope of a state’s response to a particular issue. (In fact, the 
concept of adaptive management, pioneered in environmental law but susceptible 
of application elsewhere, presupposes that risk assessments may change over time 
and contemplates a continual process of adjustments.233) 
Fourth, a risk-based approach also can facilitate engagement by a broader 
array of actors with respect to state conduct. Smaller states and civil society are 
increasingly clamoring to have their voices heard. Thus, for instance, Micronesia 
recently sought an environmental impact statement from the Czech Republic,234 
and civil society is heavily engaged on numerous issues, such as participating in 
the governance of mechanisms for evaluating and assessing risk presented by 
particular forms of corporate conduct.235 Risk-based analysis may facilitate such 
participation. To the extent it is procedural or turns on expertise, states may more 
readily heed outside inputs. This has certainly been the experience of international 
environmental law. (To give one example, the Aarhus Convention Compliance 
Committee has suggested that foreign nationals should be permitted to engage a 
state’s domestic environmental decision-making.236 And as one commentator has 
put it, it is undoubtedly the case that “procedure serves to enable, guide and at 
                                                 
231  Cf. Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 
107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 317 (2013) (“[C]ontemporary circumstances . . . require the recognition of 
a fundamental legal obligation upon sovereigns to note the interests of others when making policy 
choices that directly affect them.”). 
232  Esty, supra note 229, at 1493. 
233  See, for example, Cooney & Lang, supra note 13, at 534.  
234 Jutta Brunée, International Environmental Law and Community Interests: Procedural Aspects 13, in 
COMMUNITY OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Eval Benvenisti & Georg Nolte eds., 
forthcoming 2017). 
235  See, for example, Articles of Association, International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ 
Association art. 3.3.3, INT’L CODE OF CONDUCT ASSC’N, https://perma.cc/Q8YZ-BMDJ (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2017); Voluntary Principles Initiative—Guidance on Certain Role [sic] and Responsibilities of NGOs, 
VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES, https://perma.cc/EEP4-RJNE (last visited Oct. 9, 2017); see also Articles 
of Association, supra, at art. 11, (permitting ICOCA to certify companies); International Code of Conduct 
for Private Security Service Providers ¶ 6(d), INT’L CODE OF CONDUCT ASSC’N, https://perma.cc/95CH-
RVGJ (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (discussing “deter[ing]” abuses); Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights, VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES, https://perma.cc/8BXH-F5QU (last visited Oct. 9, 2017) 
(discussing “accurate, effective risk assessments”). 
236  Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Compliance Committee, Report 
on the Seventh Meeting, Addendum, ¶ 28, UN Doc. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2005/2/Add.3 (Mar. 14, 
2005); see also Rio Declaration, supra note 21, at 5, Principle 10 (“States shall facilitate and encourage 
public awareness and participation.”). 
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times even compel interaction between states and other international actors, 
including non-state actors.”237) 
There are a number of reasons why the tandem of risk assessment and 
greater engagement by outside actors may be appealing for states. “Recent work 
on the legitimacy of international institutions has highlighted the importance of 
‘input legitimacy,’ as well as ‘output legitimacy.’”238 Engagement by non-traditional 
actors may also produce better results.239 In this regard, many of the arguments 
made regarding civil society engagement with “global governance” institutions 
obtain here, too, in that state action increasingly affects a range of actors that the 
acting state may not represent.240 
Fifth, states and other actors have access to much greater amounts of data 
and may feel confidence in making decisions on the basis of risks they discern 
from that data. The impact of (and potential hidden problems with) “Big Data” 
have been discussed in a variety of domestic law areas, from anti-discrimination 
                                                 
237  Brunée, supra note 234, at 7; see also David Gartner, Beyond the Monopoly of States, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 
595, 616–17 (2010) (“[T]here is an important literature on global administrative law, which focuses 
on the role of procedural requirements within international institutions as a means to improving 
[sic] responsiveness and accountability.”).  
238  Gartner, supra note 237, at 604; see also Kal Raustiala, Note, The ‘Participatory Revolution’ in International 
Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 539 (1997) (“NGO participation does not 
undermine but rather strengthens the regulatory powers of states and the state system. The benefits 
states accrue from NGO participation allow them to regulate ecologically harmful activities with 
greater efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy.”) (emphasis in original). Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 
657 F.2d 298, 400–01 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[T]he very legitimacy of general policymaking performed 
by unelected administrators depends in no small part upon the openness, accessibility, and 
amenability of these officials to the needs and ideas of the public.”); The Idea of Risk Characterization, 
in UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 10, at 24 (“The instrumental rationale for broad public 
participation is that it may decrease conflict and increase acceptance of or trust in decisions by 
government.”). 
239  Wirth, supra note 226, at 770 (“[P]ublic participation in defining, implementing, and applying 
international environmental law can facilitate the twin goals of accountability and efficacy.”); 
Raustiala, supra note 238, at 557 (“Th[e] growth in the complexity, scope, and regulatory nature of 
international environmental law has fostered the expansion of private sector participation . . . 
[including] [b]ecause non-state actors frequently possess better (and different) information than 
governments.”). Cf. Summary, in UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 10, at 4 (“[A]lthough potentially 
more time-consuming and cumbersome in the near term, it is often wiser to err on the side of too-
broad rather than too-narrow participation.”). 
240  Daniel M. Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 606 (1999). For instance, NGOs can act as compliance 
monitors, which creates a legitimacy feedback loop. See Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental 
Organizations and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 355 (2006) (asserting that NGOs “supply 
the personnel and resources for managing compliance that states have become increasingly 
reluctant to provide”) (quoting ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 250–51 (1995)). 
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law241 to policing.242 But states may nevertheless feel like they can harness data to 
make better-informed decisions at the international level.243 The first turn to risk 
was prompted by technology244 and risk analysis lends itself to reliance on data 
because it is essentially an exercise in forecasting. Moreover, grounding a claim in 
empiricism can amplify its perceived legitimacy. For many, decisions based on 
data are inherently more trustworthy than those predicated upon other factors, 
because an empirical approach (it is argued) screens out politics and other 
preferences that might reduce the likelihood of the “right” decision being taken.245 
Indeed, some have argued that risk-based action can help to address a legitimacy 
deficit in international law for this reason.246 And “concepts of ‘threats’ and ‘risk’ 
have become closely associated with scientific knowledge.”247 
Sixth, use of risk assessments may create greater vertical congruence—that 
is, between domestic and international approaches. As David Wirth has noted, the 
“‘internationalization’ of environmental law . . . raised expectations of congruence 
between the international system and national decision-making procedures.”248 
The uptake of environmental impact assessments from the national to the 
international level is a good example of this phenomenon.249 But the vector can 
                                                 
241  See, for example, Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 
(2016). 
242  See, for example, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 136 U. PA. L. 
REV. 327 (2015). 
243  Cf. Annecoos Wiersema, Uncertainty, Precaution and Adaptive Management in Wildlife Trade, 36 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 375, 418 (2015) (“[E]nough data can give rise to sufficient levels of certainty to inform 
decisions using modeling and extrapolations.”). 
244  Report of the Working Group on International Liability, supra note 114, at 150 (“A revolution in technology 
. . . has extended dramatically man’s power to control his environment, creating a corresponding 
need for the urgent development of legal norms.”). 
245  But cf. Judgment in the Risk Decision Process, in UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 10, at 39 (“Individuals 
and groups that do not share the judgments and assumptions about the problem formulation that 
underlie a risk characterization may well see the information it provides as invalid, illegitimate, or 
not pertinent.”); PEEL, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE, supra note 21, at 65 (“[T]here 
may be a divergence in the way risks are perceived between ‘experts’ and the ‘lay public.’”); Vern R. 
Walker, The Myth of Science as a ‘Neutral Arbiter’ for Triggering Precautions, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 197, 198 (2003) (making “a risk determination cannot be a matter of ‘pure science’”).  
246  PEEL, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE, supra note 21, at 48–50. 
247  Id. at 65. 
248  Wirth, supra note 226, at 770. 
249  See, for example, Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm, supra note 118, at 158 (“The legal 
obligation to conduct an environmental impact assessment under national law was first developed 
in the United States.”); NEIL CRAIK, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT: PROCESS, SUBSTANCE AND INTEGRATION 23 (2008) (“EIA norms have not only 
spread horizontally to other states, but they have also spread vertically, influencing the development 
of EIA norms in international law and within international organizations.”); Charles M. Kersten, 
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go both ways. Thus, for instance, the regulations implementing the Dodd-Frank 
provisions on conflict minerals required that companies follow a nationally or 
internationally recognized due diligence framework, and the OECD’s Due 
Diligence Guidance was deemed to satisfy this.250 
B.  Is Risk Risky? 
While the prior Section highlighted potential reasons (many of them salutary) 
for risk’s rise, in this Section, I explore ways in which risk may not be an unalloyed 
good. To that end, I offer a preliminary assessment of the consequences of the 
increasing use of risk in international law. At least two sets of questions can be 
asked: (1) how risk-based decisions can be and are reviewed; and (2) whether risk 
analysis promotes horizontal harmonization or fragmentation. 
The first consequence of the rise of risk is the corollary to a number of the 
reasons I have adduced for why it has occurred—that is, while risk-based 
decisions may be easier for external actors to shape, and may have (or be perceived 
to have) a certain objectivity to the extent decisions are predicated upon 
assessments of risk (or based on empirics), they may also be less susceptible to 
judicial review. For one thing, courts tend to be more deferential with respect to 
procedural law than they are with respect to substantive law.251 Moreover, 
empirical claims regarding risk are fundamentally difficult to adjudicate. Consider 
for instance the long-standing and thorny domestic law conversation about how 
to analyze risks under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),252 
including in particular high-impact, low-probability events,253 or the way courts 
                                                 
Note, Rethinking Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 34 YALE. J. INT’L L. 173, 173 (2009) 
(“The theory of EIA emerged in the domestic context.”). 
250  Conflict Minerals Final Rule, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 249(b) (2012) (“The OECD’s ‘Due Diligence 
Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas’ 
satisfies our criteria and may be used as a framework for purposes of satisfying the final rule’s 
requirement that an issuer exercise due diligence in determining the source and chain of custody of 
its conflict minerals.”); see also Martin-Ortega, supra note 217, at 66. 
251  Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978) (“[I]f 
courts continually review agency proceedings to determine whether the agency employed 
procedures which were, in the court's opinion, perfectly tailored to reach what the court perceives 
to be the ‘best’ or ‘correct’ result, judicial review would be totally unpredictable.”). 
252  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1969).  
253  See, for example, Carla Mattix & Kathleen Becker, Scientific Uncertainty Under the National Environmental 
Policy Act, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1125, 1133, 1142 (2002); Irene Weintraub, Note, NEPA and Uncertainty 
in Low Impact, High Risk Scenarios: Nuclear Energy as a Case Study, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1565, 1567–
68 (2016) (“[C]ourts have continued to interpret NEPA’s requirements in areas of uncertainty in 
different ways.”); Michael Hill, Note, NEPA at the Limits of Risk Assessment: Whether to Discuss a 
Potential Terrorist Attack on a Nuclear Power Plant Under the National Environment Policy Act, 78 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 3007, 3025–28 (2010). Indeed, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) initially 
required federal agencies to take a “worst-case” approach, before subsequently revising its 
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have struggled with scientific evidence. As Robert McCorquodale has asserted 
with respect to one risk-based area at the international level, “it is difficult to 
establish a clear standard of business due diligence that is adjudicated by dispute 
settlement bodies.”254 A further difficulty is that science, which underlies many 
risk claims, changes quickly, but judgments do not—that is, even if one were able 
to obtain reliable judgments, would one really want to revisit them every few years 
if the underpinnings have fallen away?255 
These difficulties are compounded before international bodies that tend to 
be less experienced with—and may have fewer authorities to engage in—rigorous 
factfinding, which in turn may be necessary for a true evaluation of a risk-based 
claim.256 Thus, for instance, while there have been some recent positive examples 
of judicial engagement with scientific questions,257 the ICJ’s treatment of science 
in the Pulp Mills and Certain Activities and Construction of a Road cases has been 
roundly criticized. For instance, in Pulp Mills, the court considered an argument 
that Uruguay was not required to consider remote risks258 and did appear not to 
delve deeply into certain evidentiary questions.259 Sophie Schiettekatte has 
summarized that the “ICJ [was] heavily criticized for its deference when it comes 
to evidence of a highly scientific or technical matters [sic] . . . .”260 Even in the 
ICJ’s recent decision in the Certain Activities and Construction of a Road cases, which 
marked a certain amount of progress in my view, Judge ad hoc Dugard expressed 
                                                 
regulation in favor of analysis of “reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts.” Todd S. 
Aagaard, A Functional Approach to Risks and Uncertainties Under NEPA, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. 
L. 87, 97 (2012); Charles F. Weiss, Note, Federal Agency Treatment of Uncertainty in Environmental Impact 
Assessments Under the CEQ’s Amended NEPA Regulation § 1502.22: Worst Case Analysis or Risk 
Threshold, 86 MICH. L. REV. 777, 778 (1988). Compare 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (1979), with 40 C.F.R. § 
1502.22(b). 
254  Robert McCorquodale, Corporate Social Responsibility and International Human Rights Law, 87 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 385, 392 (2009). 
255  Cf. FOSTER, supra note 129, at 317. 
256  Some states may even take the view that scientific disputes are non-justiciable at international law. 
See Southern Bluefin Tuna (N. Z. v. Japan, Austl. v. Japan), 23 R.I.A.A. 1, 28 (2006) (“questions of 
scientific judgment . . . are not justiciable.”); see also JAMES GERARD DEVANEY, FACT-FINDING 
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 74 (2016). 
257  Some have cited the South China Sea arbitration as a model. See, for example, Sophie Schiettekatte, 
Building the Bridge Between Science and Law at the International Court of Justice: From Ex Parte to Ex Curia 
Experts at 9 (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 9), https://perma.cc/5BDN-MJUG; Mbengue, 
supra note 200, at 287; see generally FOSTER, supra note 129, at 131 (asserting that there are a “diversity 
of procedures” now used by courts and tribunals to undertake scientific fact-finding). 
258  Arg. v. Uru., supra note 17, at ¶ 203. 
259  Id. at 86 ¶ 213; see also id. at ¶ 6 (Yusuf, J., concurring); Schiettekatte, supra note 257, at 7. Cf. Arg. v. 
Uru., supra note 17, at 111, ¶ 6 (Al-Khasawneh J. & Simma J., dissenting). For criticism of the ICJ 
for failing to articulate standards to guide EIAs, see Plakokefalos, supra note 34, at 14–15. 
260  Schiettekatte, supra note 257, at 3. 
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concerns261 and Diane Desierto argued that “the Court ultimately remained 
opaque on the method and criteria it used to assess the degree of ‘risk of 
transboundary harm’ that would be sufficient to trigger a State’s obligation to 
conduct an EIA.”262 Moreover, while in theory a ‘public accountability’ 
mechanism could be effective at the international level, there are significant 
differences between NEPA practice in the U.S. and international decision-making. 
For one thing, the Aarhus Convention notwithstanding, those across a border 
who are affected by potential decisions may have few rights to intervene.263 
Second, risk-based law may be unevenly applied, both as a matter of 
principle and as a matter of practice. This may or may not be a good thing. For 
instance, risk-based law tends to distinguish between states based on their capacity 
to detect risk.264 Such differentiation would in the case of human rights, for 
example, be problematic. Moreover, to the extent that risk assessments disguise 
underlying value judgments,265 risk-based law may polarize states. Further, the risk 
threshold remains substantially uncertain. Consider for instance the many 
standards for when to apply a precautionary approach, ranging from “reasonable 
scientific plausibility” to “credible” to “non-negligible.”266 
States may also simply judge risk in specific cases differently and risk may be 
a vehicle for biases and exaggerations. Thus, for instance, any number of the 
disputes to which I have referred in this Article evidence that states may reach 
different conclusions regarding risk (e.g., whether Japanese fishing plans were 
hazardous to bluefin tuna stocks). There are also many ways to get risk “wrong” 
or ways in which individuals’ biases may be manifest in their identification of risks 
                                                 
261  Certain Activities and Construction of a Road (separate opinion of Dugard, J.), supra note 34, at ¶ 34 
(“The fact-finding of the Court cannot be substantiated. To make matters worse the decision of the 
Court cannot be reconciled either with the reasoning on the obligation to conduct an environmental 
impact assessment employed by the Court in Construction of a Road or with the rules relating to 
environmental impact assessments expounded by the Court.”); see also DEVANEY, supra note 256, at 
27 (“A number of commentators have argued that the Court has traditionally employed a number 
of different tactics in order to avoid engaging with complex factual and scientific determinations.”); 
Schiettekatte, supra note 257, at 8. 
262  Diane Desierto, Evidence but not Empiricism? Environmental Impact Assessments at the International Court 
of Justice in Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) 
and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica Along the San Juan River (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica), EJIL 
TALK (Feb. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/F5YN-JW2. 
263  Kersten, supra note 249, at 187. 
264  KULESZA, supra note 29, at 73. 
265  Bodansky, supra note 240, at 621 (“Assessing risk is a scientific task, but determining what to do in 
response requires value judgments about what levels of risk are acceptable.”). Cf. Tara Parker-Pope, 
Wrong About Risk? Blame Your Brain, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2008), https://perma.cc/ZCT4-Q53G. 
266  See FOSTER, supra note 129, at 257. 
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to evaluate.267 This suggests that the possibility that states will increasingly disagree 
regarding what risk-based law is telling them to do—at least to the extent it is 
substantive and not only procedural. Moreover, it even suggests that states could 
invoke risk to overreact to particular phenomena. 
VI.  CONCLUSION  
In this Article, I have sought to show that risk-based law is on the rise. It has 
enormous potential to help frame solutions to today’s most difficult problems. 
That said, there are significant enough differences in the way risk analysis is 
formulated outside the environmental law area that much work remains to be 
done if the trend I have identified is truly to bear fruit. This is not just a matter of 
selecting the right tool from the tool set I have sought to depict—obligation 
versus authorization, substantive versus procedural, contextual versus categorical. 
It is also a more specific question about how to construct the risk-based rule. 
                                                 
267  This includes whether individuals can bring an example of the forecast harm to mind (the availability 
heuristic), what Cass Sunstein calls probability neglect (overestimation of a harm because of how 
awful it would be if it materialized), see Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases and 
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 63 (2002), and loss aversion. See also Kahan et al., supra note 26, at 1077–78; 
Analysis, in UNDERSTANDING RISK, supra note 10, at 112–13. 
